National Law School Journal
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 1

1-7-1991

Nations and Nationalism in the Modern World
Imanuel Geiss

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj

Recommended Citation
Geiss, Imanuel (1991) "Nations and Nationalism in the Modern World," National Law School Journal: Vol.
3: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol3/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact library@nls.ac.in.

(1991) 3 NLSJ 3

Nation and Nationalism in the Modern World
IMANUELGEISS

In OUt present world of turmoil we find that nationalism, or at least exaggerated
nationalism, lies at the root of most contemporary conflicts; We have to live under a
permanent paradox: On the one hand, the globalisation of world politics and of living
conditions is making jerky, but steady progress - European Expansion Overseas,
Industrial
Revolution,
Imperialism,
the two World Wars. The Cold War and
Decolonisation are the most important stages of that development. But that "progress"
also implies crisis for societies in the ferment of rapid and radical change. Thus, as a
reaction against globalisation in the World, we have a resurgence of nationalisms, an
explosive blend of modern and traditional elements.
The more presently the Cold War between the two Super-Powers is fading with the
collapse of Communism, the agony of the Soviet Union and the Unification of Germany,
the more national, regional or local particularisms come to the fore and provoke new
conflicts, in the Third World as well as in the former Second World, the by now excommunist spheres of Europe and Northern Asia. These conflicts had more often than not
been submerged or suppressed by imperial rule of one form or another - dynastic
imperial rule in East Central Europe before World War I, colonial rule in most parts of
the Third World before World War II, autocratic, totalitarian Communist rule in the
Soviet Union and China in the recent past or the very present.
Nation and nationalism belong to the many modern concepts, the definition of which
would never find agreement amongst scholars, politicians or nationalists. Thus, a rough
working definition of my own must do for the moment: As a nation can be described a
people or any number of peoples, who have one state, sovereign or autonomous, and
identify with it positively: This-is our state Nationalism, therefore, would be the claim
for a state, again independent or autonomous, of a people. This formula, at first sight,
sounds innocent enough, but immediately becomes full of explosive implications, the
more we move concretely into political history, the more so, if we distinguish between
three major levels of nationalisms: We normally associate "nationalism" with the
national state of European provenance. But there are two more levels, one above, the
other below that of the national state---pan-nationalisms
with an imperial stance, and
ethnic sub-nationalism.

Nations

and Nationalism:

The European

Experience

Since the concept of the national state first came from Europe or even Western
Europe, it might be a useful exercise in applied history to take stock of the historical
practice of nationalism in Europe. After all, the development of nation and nationalism in
Europe has produced historical precedents for most problems and conflicts in the new
national states of the Third W orld-nation-building
and its problems, religious and ethnic
minorities, irredentas and hegemony inside and outside, the explosive issue of boundaries,
etc., transferred to the Third World by Colonialism and Imperialism. If charity begins at
home, it is time to explore Eurol-'Can nationalism, with its 'positive contributions to
World History, but also with its limitations and negative consequences even before the
concept of nationalism and the nation state had taken root in ex-colonial states.
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A rational analysis of the European experience might help to find constructive
solutions for the many pressing problems in the Third World: The historical mechanisms
at work in forming the European national state are basically the same as in the process of
"nation-building" in the Third World. And there are, after all, too many explosive conflict
matters lying about also in this part of the world, too many fuses being lit or already
actually burning. As an outsider, however, one has to tread warily in a field full of mines.
My offer now only can be a straightforward historical analysis of European nationalism in
the past, as self-critical and intellectually honest as possible for a European, who, of
course, will never be able to shed some of his limitations.

,

The European nations are the historical end-product of one element of the "West" that
we have become so accustomed to take for granted that it requires a special intellectual to .
become conscious of it-its pluralism. By'the "West", I understand historically that
complex phenomenon, that started with Sumeria and Ancient Egypt about 3000 B.C., but
extended geographically, form Persia to Portugal, after 1492 even to America and
Australia. In contrast to India and China, where, for different reasons, no nations in the
Western sense could form, the "West" was always geographically ethnically and culturally
so diverse that it became impossible to evolve or impose uniformity one way or the
other. A sequence of great empires rose and fell, shifting the centre of power gradually to
the West until, after the downfall of the West Roman Empire in 476, the "West" came to
be confined more or less to Latin Western Europe. With the invasion of the Barbarians
new peoples entered the pale of Western Civilisation-Germanic
and South Slav tribes,
Normans and Hungarians. They all interacted with Romanized inhabitants of different
origin, Celts, Celt-Iberians, Italians etc., indifferent ways and with varying intensity.
Between them, they laid the basis for the future proto-nations, however uniform the Latin
culture of the Roman and Greek Churches may have looked from outside.
Historically, we have four great structural boundaries in Europe, which are manmade, i.e. the products of history, in contrast to ecological boundaries drawn by Nature
and physical geography, such as between territories of peasants and cities and NOMAD
land, marked by the contrast between steppe or deserts and fertile plains or hills: three are
dividing Europe East-West, another North-South. The first such historical structural
divides are the former frontiers of the Roman Empire to the North and West, once fortified
by the Roman Limes. Only on the soil of the former West Roman Empire we had first
proto-national successor kingdoms led by aristocracies of Germanic origins who formed
the basis for the first national monarchies of western Europe after l000-Portugal,
Spain,
France, England, while Italy remained fragmented until its "Risorgimento" in 1859/61.
The second structural boundary arose with the final partition of the Roman Empire
between West and East Rome in 395. Invading Slav tribes, followed by Bulgarians and
Hungarians of Central Asian origin, settled into prevailing ecclesiastical conditions they
met in their places of final destination. Eventually, they thus prolonged the line of
division between rivalling Christian Churches in Rome and Byzantine to the north,
splitting not only Roman Catholic West Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks) from the GreekOrthodox East Slavs (Russians), but also the Catholic Northern South Slavs (Slovenes,
Croats) from their Southern cousins (Serbs, Bulgarians). While northern South Slavs
were dominated and strongly influenced by Italians, Germans and Hungarians as their
more direct neighbours and overlords to the West and North, the Orthodox Southern Slavs
were mostly dominated by Great Empires, first Byzantium, to be followed by the Muslim
Ottoman Turks. Since the Orthodox Russians of the medieval Kiev Rus were under the
suzerainty of Muslim Tartars for more than two centuries (1240-1480), Latin Europe
became largely identified with the "West".
The third structural boundary was the River Elbe. The conquest of the then heathen
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Saxons by the Franks under Charlemagne before 800 made the River, for the first time, a
great divide for Europe. It was levelled again by the Coles, Czechs and Hungarians
embracing Roman Catholicism in before 1000, by German Expansion to the East after
1000. Since about 1500, the River Elbe again became a structural divide by a process
pertaining to the realm of socio-economic changes: East of the Elbe there developed what
became to be known as "second serfdom": Peasants became increasingly dependent on the
lords of their manors, whether landed gentry of moderate holdings (roughly one village per
manor) or magnates with huge landed possessions. To the West of the River Elbe the
trend, first starting in the lIe-de-France, when Paris was finally made the capitai of the
new French Kingdom in 987, continued and spread: Peasants, producing for the urban
markets developed the tendency to achieve personal freedom. East of the River Blbe,
however, peasants, increasingly as serfs, produced for their landlords who sold their
agrarian products to the modernising west. Later, the Reformation and Industrial
Revolution mitigated again the impact of the Elbe as a structural divide, but it remained
important for the development of Germany, before and after the founding of her Second
Empire in 1871. It was, therefore, no historical coincidence that the River Elbe became
the great divide betwccn the New West and the Communist East in 1945.
Reformation and Counterreformation betwccn them mark the fourth great structural
divide within Latin Europe: Northern Europe became largely Protestant, the South
remained overwhelmingly Catholic. In the middle, mainly represented by Germany, there
was strong overlapping and intermingling: On the one hand, there is a parallel split
between mostly Protestant South and heavily Catholic South as generally in Europe. On
the other hand, in Central Germany we have no clear-cut boundary.
After Reformation and Enlightenment,
both the rise and spread of Industrial
Revolution and modern political revolutions since the 17th century further strengthened
the structural divide betwccn Latin and Orthodox Europe: They all had as their origins on
former West Roman soil, even Industrial Revolution, moving as it did, from Northern
England (and Southern Scotland) to the Continent, from there to the South (Belgium,
France) and the East (Germany). Since, meanwhile, Orthodox Tsarist Russia had expanded
also to the West of genuinely Russian territories, the old frontier of 395/1053 between
Latin and Orthodox Europe was further blurred. But by and large, Europe (and its
extension to the West America) industrialised more in her Latin and Protestant West and
North, with a trend, however, to weaken modernisation towards her peripheries to the
South (Mezzogiorne-Southern Italy, Southern France, Spain and Portugal) and East (East
Elbian Germany, Poland Baltic Provinces or Russia, Hungary). Modernisation in Latin
national states since the middle aged, based more recently on industrial production, made
for the rule of Parliament, of public law, and thus of Democracy. After the catastrophies
of the two World Wars, Western Europe, organised in the Economic European
Community, has emerged, as the contemporary product of these processes, from the
spread of the Roman Empire to Industrialism.
Their overlapping made for very
complicated patterns, which even more complicated the inherent principle of pluralism in
the West.
Pluralism, however, also meant constant rivalry and permanent connict of powers,
small and great. The history of power politics within the European System largely
follows that of the great socio-economic processes of the "longue duree". Out of the
welter of feudal anarchy since the end of the West Roman Empire, there emerged, since
about 1000 also on the basis of economic and demographic growth in ever greater
political units. They became the general framework for proto-national states, later our
modern nations of Europe. With the settling of the Normans in French Normandy 911
and the defeat of the Hungarians by the Germans near Augsburg 955, the last invaders of
medieval Europa had been pacified. After 955, apart from brief incursions by Mongols and
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Turks at the periphery, for almost 1000 years Latin Europe newer more suffered invasions
from outside, until 1943/45 in the course of World War II. The fIrst national states since
the middle ages developed according to universal historical mechanisms of expansion
within geographical entities-the
British Isles, France, the Iberian Peninsula. Monarchy
enforced there regionally what could never be imposed continent-wide-hegemony
of
centralised or centralising power.
These four states of Western Europe, all of them on former West Roman territory,
became the fIrst national monarchies in the late middle ages. All of them had emerged in
territories of the former West Roman Empire, that is to the west of the Roman limes.
And they had become the fIrst stable Germanic successor states to the Roman Empire. In
contrast to medieval Germany, they had a clear political centre in their capital cities,
shifting in the case of Spain and Portugal with the advance of the Reconquista and the
political unification of Spain. Their main social basis were peasants, citizens and gentry,
all co-ordinated by the Crown. Peasants were directly selling their agrarian products on the
growing urban markets against cash and had, more or less, the tendency towards personal
freedom. Citizens of growing urban centres lived on intercontinental long-distance trade
and pre-industrial industries. Usually their rising bourgeoisie co-operated with the lower
ranks of nobility, the knights, against the feudal crownvassals, the magnates. These older
proto-national states, above all England and France, later became the models for modern
nationalisms, i.e. for peoples without sovereign states of their own.
The rise of the new proto-national monarchies coincided with the emergence of what
became the modern state. Here, striking parallels to the process of modern nation building
in the Third World can be seen: Also traditional, medieval Europe had been fragmentated,
largely on the basis of agrarian subsistence economy. The main instruments of modem
state building were the imposition of taxes from above, military force and the rule of law,
which, in the case of Western Latin Europe, including Germany, was derived from the law
of the Roman Empire. The imposition of the modem state was a painful process, full of
conflicts and coercion, which transformed old Europe just as violently as it is presently
transforming the Third World.
Also in Europe, frontiers of the modern state could cut through older ethnic entities,
such as the Alemanians, who came to live in Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Austria,
Switzerland and Alsace. No one of them would dream today of a national state of the
Alemanians for one simple reason: Nowhere are they discriminated or repressed
minorities, but everywhere they are integrated into their present national states, Germany,
Austria, Switzerland and France. On the other hand, wherever minorities felt not to be
treated as fIrst class citizens by modern European states, they became Irredentas, after the
model of the Italian minorities in Austria-Hungary since 1878. In Europe as well, older
loyalties-feudal,
tribal, religious, monarchical-were
politicised since the French
Revolution and transposed either into nationalism or ethnic sub-nationalism. But there are
two main differences in the nation-building of Europe and the Third World: It took Europe
centuries, what the Third World is presently experiencing in decades, and the rulers and
ruling classes of the emerging natiooal states in Europe where not foreigners or had
largely assimilated to the subjects in language and religion.
There are two facts about the medieval proto-national state, which Europeans today
are no longer appreciating positively, one internal, one external: Internally, the new
national monarchies sooner or later evicted Jews from their "national" territory-England
1290, France 1306 and 1394, Spain 1492, Portugal 1497. At least in England, there
emerges a link between the rise of Estates, representing the towns and the nobility, to
political power and the expulsion of Jews: The Parliament started its career to political
sovereignty with the "Model Parliament" of 1295 after Jews had been eliminated as

~-------

u

••

__

•

.u

_ ~

_.

__ ~

0

Nation and Nationalism in the Modern World

7

private financiers to the Crown. The English Parliament enforced its claim inherent in the
establishment of Estates to be the only legitimate source of public funds for the main
business of Government in older history, waging war. For England, the breakthrough of
Parliament with the "Model Parliament" coincided in 1295 with war against France and
Scotland, then formally united for the first time in the "Auld Alliance" against their
common hostile neighbour England. The heritage of Anti-Judaism, built into the rise of
western national states, took an even more sinister turn since the 19th century:
Antisemitism, sooner or later, became the hallmark of most new nationalisms in Europe,
Greece and Italy always being honourable exceptions.
In its outward relations, early West European conflicts at first defined and formed
themselves by protracted wars. Annual wars, usually against hostile neighbours, had been
an essential element of all organized societies. Now they took a different turn: They were
placed into the service of state-building or nation-building by eliminating either weaker
rivals for power of the same religion or "enemies" of their own religion. Spain and
Portugal had their "national" versions of "Reconquista" to expel the Muslim Moors from
the Iberian Peninsula, while both Christian states, in their turn, were locked in jnternal
rivalry. The Crusades were the equivalent of "Reconquista" to the East and supplied for
medieval France the prime "national" experience, while the Hundred Years War (133'7/391453) provided for France the second, but for England the first rallying point for
becoming consciously French or English respectively. Also the Hundred Years War
became crucial for the internal structure of their national monarchies, both over the
problem of financing the Crown through taxes: During periods of military setbacks and
crisis Parliament in England defended and strengthened its monopoly as sole legitimate
source for income from the public to the Central Government, while in France the
Crown, finally emerging victorious from the Hundred Years War, was able to rule largely
without the Etats Generaux. They also had been called in times of defeat, but they were
ignored by the Crown once it had proved successful in the end.
Thus, we also have a clear connection between failure and success in nation-building
through war on the one hand, the rise of Parliamentary rule on the other. To take only
two extremes from the European experience: Magna Charta 1215, which instituted the
English version of Estates, was imposed by Anglo-Norman barons against King John
Lackland as a reaction against the defeat at Bouvines 1214, which inaugurated the rise of
France as the first, and for centuries the only Great Power of Europe. And the French
Revolution can be understood as a violent reaction of the Third Estate, which claimed to
be the nation in a modem sense, against the absolute Monarchy that had failed so
desastrously in its bid for hegemony over Europe under Luis XIV in 1713/14. The end of
the Hundred Years War, 1453, coincided with the conquest of Constantinople. It gave a
boost to the search for a sea-route to "India", whicn then for Europe was everything
between the East Coast of Africa and Japan with real India as its geographical centre.
Participation in European Expansion Overseas to increase the "national" revenue through
sharing in Overseas Trade became the second great criterion for European nationalism.
The by n.ow well-established first four "national monarchies" of the West and South West
took the lead and were followed by the new nation of Holland about one century later: The
Dutch immediately plunged into Expansion Overseas about 1600, even as a war measure
in their struggle for national liberation or emancipation from Spanish rule. Holland
quickly rose to became the economically strongest, socially and politically most modem
nation, based now, for the first time, on the principle of toleration, also for the Jews,
again for predominantly economic reasons. Holland was soon also joined in all respects
by the Scandinavian monarchies, Denmark and Sweden, again, as Portugal and Spain, in
constant neighbourly rivalry amongst each other, and even, for a short while, by
Brandenburg-Prussia (1683-1721), the nucleus of the new German national state. They all
NLSJ-2
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joined in the scramble for colonial possessions overseas, for a share in the lucrative trade
with the East, but also in the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the West. "Colonies" in the
New World in the 17th and 18th centuries were at first mainly sugar producing colonies
based on black slaves imported from Africa.
Western Imperialism and Colonialism was not so much the highest stage of
Capitalism (Lenin), but of European Expansion Overseas, following exactly the same
pattern: New national states clamoured for a share in imperialist or colonial expansion,
sooner or later after they had been constituted-Italy,
Belgium, Germany, to be joined
towards the end of the 19th century by Japan and the United States.
While the European nations defmed themselves inside and outside through internal
and external conflicts, gradually the term "nation" developed from obscure beginnings.
"Natio", the Latin original word, refers back to common descent from tribal clusters of
barbarious peoples in Roman times. With the emergence of medieval universities,
"natio", plural "nationes", thence "nations" was used to group together students and
professors from vaguely defined geographical regions. They varied from university to
university, usually three, and they had not yet anything in common with the future
nations. They just lumped together people from broad directions of the windrose, who
linguistically or "nationally" in a modem sense, had little in common, e.g. Poles in the
"German" nation in Western universities. A first step to politization was done, still in the
context of the Roman Church, when the great Re,form Councils of the late Middle Ages
adopted the division into "nationes" from the universities. Universities, after all, then still
were ecclesiastical institutions of higher learning, which the Council Fathers knew
intimately well, because they had been trained there themselves. Humanism in the age of
Renaissance articulated the first hint of modem "nationalism", usually going back, where
possible, to the barbarous ancestors of Germans, Poles etc. before the spread of Roman
Civilisation. Around that time, the term "German Nation" in the meaning of the Reform
Councils was first added to the official title of the "Holy Roman Empire" about 1500.
The addition "of the German Nation" was to give more precision to that diffuse political
structure that was neither "Holy". nor a "Roman Empire" nor "of the German Nation" in
our modem understanding, as Edward Gibbon once wittily remarked. Still the lable stuck,
and it was the first instance of "nation" being ascribed to a political concept.
The next step, of course, was the French Revolution. It consciously restricted
"nation" to the French living in revolutionary France. Napoleon I even further enhanced
this concept by inventing the "Grande Nation", perhaps in an effort to compensate for his
Empire, which harked back to Charlemagne: After the Germans had had their Empire,
now it was the turn of the French as the true imperial and revolutionary nation. "Patriots"
in other countries took up the cue. Ever since, "natipn" became the battle-cry of the
revolutionary Left for a very long time, indeed.
Modem nationalism at first was, therefore, a disruptive element hitting hardest the
great dynastic Empires of Europe. The "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" that
expired in 1806, under the dual onslaught of the French Revolution and of Napoleons
Empire of.the "Grande Nation", was the first victim. In its final form it was the product
of decline from Germany having been the first Power Centre of Latin Europe afterthe
German victory over the Hungarians in 955. The Ottoman Empire, Austria and Russia
came under varying pressure next, even England over Ireland, her first stepping-stone
towards Expansion Overseas: "Plantations", the word used for the mass settlement of
Protestant colonists in Ulster after the Ulster Rebellion of 1609, was then identical with
the term for English colonists in the New World.
The French Revolution, in that respect only the executor of the ideas of radical
Enlightenment, introduced a new element that later became even more explosive: Against
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the maze of feudal rights, privileges and manifold exceptions, the French Revolution tried

to establish clear and rational structures. Its ideal of uniformity, wherever possible,was
partly inspired by the glowing reports of Jesuit missionaries in the powerful Chinese
Empire that helped to spark a fad for everything Chinese. And China, of course, was and
is the very essence of centralisation and cultural uniformity on the level of imperial or
national organisation. The Jacobins escalated the drive for centralising uniformity by their
'slogan "law nation une et indivisible", the one and indivisible nation. In order to impose
one French national, all regional or cultural difierences had to be suppressed, including
Jews as a separate religious and cultural identity, but also social differences. Thus,
regional autonomy and social self-organisation, e.g. in trade unions, was out of the
question. National uniformity of the progressive French Nation became the great ideal,
even beyond the Jacobins and their successors in the Radical Left. Inside and outside
France, the logical outcome was a policy of rigosous assimilation, cultural and political,
outside France in the vast colonial empire of the 19th century. The results of the concept
of "Ia nation une et indivisible" became disastrous when later applied outside France.
The extension of English and French principles occurred with the American
Revolutions, both in North America and in Latin America before and after 1789. Their
explosive consequences were muffled by the fact that European settlers could safely
expand into vast power vacua, usually populated very thinly by fragmentated tribes on the
level of hunters and gatherers or of extensive agrarian subsistence production. Their
conflict potential largely was turned against the mother countries who tried to protect the
interests of the indigenous populations, at least theoretically, against the onslaught of
expansionist white settlers with an unsatiable hunger for more land. The real destructive
potential of the Jacobin principle of enforced centralisation and assimilation ("Ia nation
une et indivisible") made itself felt gradually in other parts of the Old Continent, with
settled populations in religions, which did not know traditions of proto-national and
national developments over centuries, as in France since about 987.
Under the influence of the French Revolution and of German Romanticism, we have
a crop of "national questions" in those parts of Europe, that had, by definition, no
national states, because they were under the domination of multi-national Empires or were
politically fragmentated. Since the French Revolution, they also pressed for national
states, taking France and/or England as their shining examples: The most powerful and
most prosperous national states became obvious models for New Nationalisms. The new
National Questions were, in chronological order, the Polish, Irish, South Slav, German
and Italian Question. For all their specifically "national" differences, the gist of the New
Nationalism can be summed up as the claim of people to have a national state of their
own, whether autonomous or sovereign. The dynastic empires, of course, fought such
claims, as much as they could, since they feared their ultimate disintegration, once they
conceded national autonomy or independence anywhere. The Holy Alliance of the
Congress of Vienna 1815 even tried to institutionalise the "solidarity" of monarchism
against national and social revolution, as experience<I,with the French Revolution.
But the demands of nationalism for separate states became a never ending source of
international complications, because other Great Powers tried to exploit the weakening of
their rivals by national di!;ruption. Austria since 1683 and Russia, ever since Peter the
Great, appealed to Orthodox South Slavs to rise against Muslim Rule when fighting
against the Ottoman Empire. But in 1804, now under the shadow of the Frenc~
Revolution, Austria refused to support the Serbian Uprising against the Sultan, from now
on considered as a fellow-monarch. The Serbs got help from Tsarist Russia instead,
becoming the spearheads both of Pan-Slavism and Russian expansion on the Balkan, just
as the Armenians since 1878 in the Trans-Caucasus region.
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Imperial rivalry using regional nationalism for undermining the rivalling Great
Power led deeper and deeper into the maze of Balkan politics. Not incidentally the Balkans
became Europe's proverbial "powder keg", and did provide the notorious fmal spark for the
conflagration of World War I through the outrage of Sarajevo. There is historical meaning
in the fact that the last member of the Sarajevo group, Vaso Cubrilovic, died in May this
year, at a time, when Yugoslavia is breaking up in turn, this time over the Kosovo,
populated mainly by Albanians, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is again becoming a bone of
contention between the future successor states, because of its mixed Catholic, 'Orthodox
and Muslim populations. Similarly France, Even in the Revolution of 1848 and under
Napoleon IIi, deliberately tried to destabilise Austria by fomenting national revolt in order
to compensate,her relative decline as a Great Power since the defeat of 18151 By 1870
France had been overtaken both by Russia and Germany as the strongest nations according
to numbers and qualitatively by England and Germany according to industrial development.
Modem nationalism was formulated mostly by urban intellectuals, cut off from the
peasant masses, whom they, however, idealized as the true representatives of their "folk".2
Their demand for a national state along the line of Western national states harked back to
a romanticized "national" history, taking, wherever possible, a powerful state, usually in
the Middle Ages, as their historic precedent: Modem nationalism claimed to restore former
Empires or great power structures of the poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Greek, Germans,
Italians, Serbs and Bulgarians. Restoring the glories of past Empires by modem
nationalism made for an explosive mixture, because Empires by definition usually had
expanded beyond the boundaries of a given "nation". Thus, any kind of pan-nationalism,
in reality had an "imperial" stance, which was bound to clash with other nationalisms,
since Empires usually contain "national" minorities, mostly as subject peoples who, in
the age of Nationalism, claim their right of getting a national state of their own. After the
demise of the German "Roman Empire" in 1806 the weakest link in the imperial chain
was the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the "Eastern Question" and the Balkans provided
much of the tensions that set Europe and the world ablaze in 1914.3
The social basis of modem nationalism, meanwhile, had changed under the impact of
the Industrial Revolution, demographic, economic and political expansion that went with
it. Thus, it became inevitable, that the nationalism of the greater nations also blended
with imperial ideologies: English nationalism even could boast of the largest colonial
empire the world had ever seen, French the second larges colonial empire. Great Russian
nationalism
and Tsarist Orthodox chauvinism mixed with Pan-Slavism.
Italian .
nationalism looked back to the real Roman Empire, German nationalism to the glory and
power of the fake German "Roman Empire" in tae Middle Ages. South Slav nationalism
drew its aspiration mainly from the short-lived "Great" Serbian Empire in the late Middle
Ages. Comparatively small, considering people involved and territories claims, it was
highly explosive, threatening to weaken or blow up two traditional dynastic Empires in
turn, first the Ottoman Empire of the Turks, then the Dual Monarchy of the Germans and
Hungarians in Austria-Hungary. It sufficed to provide, with the outrage of Sarajevo, the
famous spark that ignited tensions between rivalling Great Powers to escalate into the
conflagration of World War 1.4 At the same time, nationalism gradually became the
1
2
3
4

James Chastain: The Liberation of Sovereign Peoples. The French Foreign Policy of 1848. Athens
(Ohio) 1988.
AJP Taylor: The Habsburg Monarchy. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary. London
1948, quoted after Peregrin Books, 1964, pp. 32-35.
For the best detailed monograph see MS Anderson: The Eastern Question, 1774-1923. A sludy in
International Relations. London 1966, 1978.
Imanuel Geiss: Der lange Weg zur Katastrophe. Die Vorgeschich1edes Ersten Weltkrieges 1815-1914.
Munich 1990.
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domaine of the Right, approximately with the emergence of the industrial working-class
that was interested in more direct bread-and-butter-issues as part and parcel of their social
and political emancipation.
In either case, whether executed originally by the Left, or later by the Right, the
nation became the highest level of political organisation in the modem world. It received
a kind of religious sanction, as a compensation for the eclipse of religious values and
ecclesiastical authorities since the Enlightenment of the French Revolution. It became an
absolute value in itself that brooked no relative weakening by other levels of political
organisation or by higher values. The normal rivalry in a pluralistic structure, the
difficulties of finding rational and mutual acceptable "national" boundaries, made for
conflicts that exploded into two World Wars.
Antisemitism as a kind of populist pseudo-democracy and pseudo-socialism marred
the reality of nationalism also morally.s It had a strong basis in the French Left until the
Dreyfus scandal6 and was powerfully entrenched in the Russian Left, even including the
Bolsheviks.7 During the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War, they tried to
distance themselves from Antisemitism. But as a ruling party they gradually and
stealthily conformed to the All-Slav antisemitism in Russian society. After the Second
World War, Communist countries were the first to acknowledge the new State of Israel in
1948, hoping, it might join the Socialist camp. Once that expectation had failed, early
pro-Israelism turned sour and changed to Anti-Zionism, camouflaging the underlying Slav
Antisemitism,
which is now exploding openly again with the downbreak
of
Communism.
The rise of Socialism in various national states complicated matters even further,
once a proletarian internationalist Socialism of the Marxist type was confronted by
concepts of Socialism only for and within a given nation. The marriage of nation, empire
and socialism, could breed veritable monsters. Harmlessly enough, under the given
conditions, a kind of socialist Nationalism was first proclaimed by the Polish Socialist
Pilsudski against Tsarist rule in 1893, then by bourgeois Czech nationalists, i.e. both
under the conditions of not having a national state of their own. Their "national"
socialism was largely directed against Russians and Germans respectively that denied
Poland and Bohemia a national state, autonomous or sovereign. But National Socialism
was imitated first in independent nations after the traumatic experience of World War I by
Italian Fascism: Mussolini and his early supporters, after all, had been ardent left-wing
socialists before World War I. "Proletarian" internationalist Socialism, "Communism"
was only ideologically camouflaged Great Russian Chauvinism and imperialism.
Nevertheless, its rivalry with German openly National Socialism as the extreme of
German Chauvinism provided a substantial part of the conflict material that exploded in
World War II.
After the furies of World War II had a bated, national states turned out to fulfil more
modest functions, at least in the West. The warlike energies of Europe were spent for a
long time. The partitioning of the Old Continent into two rivalling blocks mobilized
energis in the West to seek a measure of integration, if only to hold its own in world
politics. After 40 years the national state has lost much of its pseudo-religious mystique,
at least in Western Europe, and has largely become the frame-work for organizing the
political life of their peoples on the national level. Increasingly, a European level is

5
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growing to supersede the nation as the highest political value. With the globalisation of
world politics, even Mankind, at least in theory and in well-meaning declarations, has
become a point of reference above Europe. Western Europe is quickly developing a new
dynamic of its own, at first only as an economic proposition, recently also adding a
political dimension. At the same time, in traditionally centralised states such as Belgium
and France, the regions, long suppressed by the nation state, are beginning to re-emerge
from imposed national uniformity. If the trend persists, then we could have the national
state relativised from two sides, from above by a new European federal system beyond the
national states, and from below by regional federalism that reasserts itself with new
vigour. The result could be a mature nationalism, reduced to organise political life on one
level amongst others, weakened or broken constructively by other levels above and below
the nation. This is, of course, only a theoretical projection into a better future, idealised
even, as long as the present positive development of the economy prevails. The reality is
still far from such an ideal, as the violence of extreme nationalism of the Basques or the
Cor~s reminds us even in Western Europe. The breakdown of Communism has left a
political, economic and social landscape, scattered with mines of mismanagement,
brutalities and dashed hopes. Communism was swept away in Eastern Central Europe by
a resurgence of nationalism that is showing ugly sides as well. The waning of the
imperial "Pax Sovietica" is also unleashing destructive forces of nationalism. Just like
the "Spring of Nations" of 1848 the new "Autumn of Nations" of 1989, as one might
call it, is setting nationalism against each other, most neighbours against their
neighbours, one dominating nation against national minorities. Rumania, but also
Bulgaria, are cases in point, so is the Soviet Union with its conflicts within its .southern
belt of Turkish minorities against other minorities, in particular the Armenians, but also
the Baltic provinces. Yugoslavia with her conflicts of Serbs against Albanians and the
Northern South Slavs (Croats and Slovenes), is yet another variation of the same type of
violent conflicts, so is Slovak nationalism, both against Czechs and Hungarians. No one
can be sure yet of what will come out of the present welter in and around the unified
Germany. Nothing to say of the continuing tragedy in and around North Ireland. Thus,
there are no reasons for Europeans to be complacent about their own nations and
nationalisms.
For the New Europe of the 1990ies the problem of frontiers to the East will also
become urgent: Where should Europe end? At he Ural? At the Order-Neisse-Frontier? It is
becoming highly probable that the second structural divide of Europe, that of 395/1054
between the Latin West and Orthodox East might coincide with the frontiers of emerging
New Europe to the East and South-East: Those parts of the former Soviet Empire that
where the first and the most rigorous in seceding from Moscow and Communism in order
to rejoin Europe, were precisely of Latin culture-Poland,
Hungary, the Baltic Republics,
the ex-GDR, Czechoslovakia. In Communist Yugoslavia, the Slovenes and Croats, again
of Latin culture, are about to secede from the Orthodox Serbs, who are clinging most
stubbornly to Communism, which they are combining with a new brand of Great
Serbiaan cha'uvinism. Similarly, Orthodox Bulgarians and Rumanians are hovering
between continuing some sort of diluted Communism and a timid turn towards Western
Democracy. In contrast, the countries of Latin culture seem to stand a better chance in
making the difficult transition from Communism to market economy and Parliamentary
Democracy, because they had participated in the development of a civil society, more or
less, in centuries since Humanism and Renaissance. If that cautious forecast turns out to
be correct, the Orthodox East and South-East would face a grim future, indeed-likely
to
go down in chaos for a very long time to come.
At least a glimpse of an outline for what a mature and moderate nationalism could
be, ideally, should emerge from the foregoing historical and political analysis:
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Nationalism reduced to the claim of an independent or autonomous state within reasonable
boundaries, the nation reduced to a functional unit as one level of collective organisations
amongst others, transferring part of its sovereign powers to aiederal European structure,
others to the World Organisations, hopefully, such as to UNO, while internally or below
giving other powers to regional or local authorities that solve concrete problems on the
spot. Such a nationalism would respect the national aspiration of other nationalisms,
ready to find compromise solutions by refraining from maximalist or fundamentalist
demands. Frontier regions with often mixed populations could closely co-operate, thus
softening the disruptive and divisive impact of national boundaries.
Such may be nothing but pious hopes, even hallow illusions that may be shattered
by the harsh realities of struggles for survival in the face of rapidly growing populations,
shrinking resources and a deteriorating environment under the pressure of demographic,
economic and ecological problems. But if we want to find a constructive way out of the
present impass, into which Mankind has landed itself, there must be at least the concept
for a more constructive alternative. Nationalism, modified and mollified by federal
structures above and below the national state, if only for sheer pragmatism, could at least
be the chance of such an constructive answer.
Nations

and

Nationalism

in the Third

World

European Colonialism and Imperialism were swept aside after the Second World War
by a wave of nationalism in the former colonies. But the anti-colonial landslide had been
prepared by the First World War and its immediate consequences-Communist
revolution
in Russia and the first substantial stirrings of indigenous nationalism or protonationalism. Leading in the process of Decolonisation was India, the prime target of
European Expansion Overseas and the great prize in the tug-of-war between England and
France during the 18th century. Ever since the comparatively quick success of anticolonialist nationalism the new national states of Asia and Africa had to face the much
more difficult task of what was quickly called "nation-building". Compared with both the
"Empire building",
which had preceded it and the "Empire dismantling"
by
Decolonisation, the real difficulties of independence in "nation-building" have cropped up
only after the end of imperialist rule, once the euphoria in the hour of victory was spent.
Presently, they have to contend with the growing tensions between the trend towards the
globalisation of the World, even the partial levelling of living conditions under the
impact of spreading industrialisation, on the one hand, a rapidly growing nationalist, even
fundamentalist reaction that stresses particular against the universal factors, on the other.
Chief Factors. Internal and External
Two main groups of factors have to be distinguished, as usual, internal and external
ones. As internal factors are to be understood all those of indigenous character within the
Third World as a whole, even if they might be external for one of the new national state,
because they might be coming from another ex -colonial national state of the Third W orId,
e.g. in the relationship between India and Pakistan. External here refers to everything
coming from outside the Third World, historically mainly from Europe, especially the
colonising powers, before the after Decolonisation: Industrial Revolution, Colonialism,
Christian Missions, the French Revolution of 1789 and their repercussions, nationalism,
the Russian October Revolution of 1917 and Communism in its varied forms-they
all
are to be considered chief influences coming from outside. After independence, the Cold
War as a global, though muffled conflict between East and West, with its impact on the
Third World, acted as a powerful political agent of outside influences. Internal factors, in
contract, provide the very human substance of the new national states, with all their
differences in "race", physical appearance, languages, religions, traditions, and cultures.
Those differences vary a great deal from one new national state to the other and, as a rule,
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within themselves. Between them, they make for a forbidding variety of national states in
Asia and Africa, which can be mastered intellectually only by a structural, macrohistorical approach.
On the other hand, the distinction between external and internal factors becomes
blurred when we consider the origins of modem nationalisms in the Third World: They go
back to a reaction of modernised native elites against discriminations practised by the
colonial powers. These new elites were formed in the schools and universities of the
colonial power, initially often enough in the very Mother Country, in our century
frequently also in America. At least in Tropical Black Africa, people of mixed origin,
usually with a European as a father, played a special part in the emergence of modem
elites that pioneered colonial nationalism.s Are the colonial products of European fathers,
missionaries, teachers and professors to be considered "external" or "internal" factors? Are
European ideas, such as nation and nationalism, once they are taken up by Indians or
Africans and turned against their colonial overlords, foreign or native? It is the old
problem all over again: From when on becomes an outside factor assimilated and integral
part of the new surroundings?
Those elementary facts and considerations alone make generalisations very hard
indeed, because for every general statement you may marshal a dozen or more exceptions,
that belie or seem to belie any generalisations. Yet, generalisations are an inevitable part
of life and of scholarship. Thence, they have their legitimate place also in a historical
analysis. With due respect and caution, more a panorama than an outright analysis is
offered here, painted with a broad brush. In fact, in order to really understand nationalism
and nations in the Third World in any depth, one would have to marshal detailed and
structured knowledge of the pre-colonial and colonial history of some 75 states in Asia
and Africa, which is clearly asking for the impossible from an individual scholar.
Comparatively detailed knowledge of some nationalisms and their pre-colonial background
and a rather superficial knowledge of the rest, but integrated into broader perspectives
gained from an intensive study of World History, must do for the moment.
As usual in History, the contemporary national states in the Third World are,
compound and very complex products of internal and external factors. On all accounts, the
very concept and the form of the national states came from Europe for two main reasons:
Reality and idea of the nation and national states originate in Western Europe, and they
were transplanted to the Third World including the Americas, by European Expansion
Overseas and Colonial Rule, however unintentionally. The national movements as
reactions against Europin colonialism
and imperialism were led by a modern
intelligentsia, that had been formed by Western schools and universities. Inevitably, most
new national states arose- within the boundaries of the former colonies.
The sequence of the main events is obvious and needs to be recalled here only very
briefly: Prepared by the First World War and its immediate consequences, Decolonisation
after the Second World War progressed about in the same chronological order as
Colonialism and Imperialism had established itself-first
India, then most of Asia,
Northern Africa, later parts of Black Africa, then the rest of Asia, the Carribean, and
Southern Africa. A special case are the Arab countries of the Middle East, most of them
had been part of die Ottoman Empire until World War I: After 1919, they came, formally
as League of Nationals Mandates, under the effective rule of England and France, however,
8
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with various degrees of internal autonomy. They.were, therefore, at the end of World War
II after 1945, best placed to attain-full rovereignty first, symbolized by the foundation of
the Arab League in the very crucial year of 1945.
India's Key Role
The pace-setting role of India for the emergence of colonial, later Third World
nationalism cannot be overlooked: She had been the original and most important aim of
European Expansion Overseas, the first major region to be conquered by a Colonial power
in Asia. India became the hard core of the British Empire, which, in its turn, advanced to
the envied model of other Imperialisms, notably French, later also German: They all
sought their "ersatz" for the kind of Indian colonial empire they had missed for one reason
or another-France
in almost neighbouring "Indochina" and in Africa, Germany in her
dream of a German-dominated "Mittelafrika" in the heart of Tropical Black Africa. With
the Indian National Congress Party India had been the first European colony to produce a
national movement, however accommodating it had been at first, representing largely the
modernised section of her traditional Brahman ruling elite.
But the first form of colonial nationalism, the Indian National Congress, had a
tremendous impact on Eastern and Southern Africa, wherever Indians had emigrated to
since 1860. Regional branches of the National Congress were sooner or later created by
emigrated Indians suirting with Natai in 1893 under no less than Mahatma Gandhi, later
in the newly formed South African Union to protect communal interests of Indians
against rising white Apartheid: Indians, with their own tradition of cultural and racial
pride shrank from the idea of bdng placed on the same level as black Africans in white
South Africa.
In Southern Africa and parts of Eastern Africa, first political organisations of early
African nationalism took a leaf out of Indian precedents and called their own first political
organisations in British colonies "African National Congress". That name even spread to
West Africa, where the first (and 0:11y)organisation of African proto-nationalists existed
between the two World Wars, the "National Congress of British West Africa", founded in
1920. Even today, the oldest and greatest political organisation of the Blacks in South
Africa, the "African National Congress" (ANC), bears witness to the importance of the
early Indian matrix.
But it was only after the First World War that Indian nationalism started in earnest,
provoked by the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and even achieved regional autonomy by
1937, just before World War II. Thus, it was only logical, that India used the weakening
of her Raj by Nazi Germany and Japan to press for full independence during World War II,
both from inside and outside, with non-violence (Gandhi) and violence (Subhas Chandra
Bose). After 1945, pressure came only from inside, this time with a characteristic mixture
of non-violence and threat with a war of liberation, if the British had persisted in staying
in power. One factor amongst others leading to the victory of the Labour Party in June
1945 certainly was that the war-weary British electorate shrank back from the prospect of
having to wage a costly colonial war on the ;ndian sub-continent right after World War II,
since the Conservatives under Churchill refused to give up India, the most precious
colonial possession of the British Crown.
Indian independence, precipitated by a revolt of the Indian Fleet in 1946, opened the
really decisive breach for the rising flood of cdonial nationalism. The price, on the other
hand, was high: the rift on the sub-continent between India and Pakistan, the outburst of
communal hatred between Hindus and Muslims, exarcerbated by fundamentalists and
extremists on both sides, millions of refugees to and fro, tremendous bloodshed through
mutual massacres in the hour of triumphant nationalism and, so far, three international
wars between both countries.
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Starting with India, Decolonisation spread to more and more colonies. Her decision
to remain in the British Commonwealth somewhat blunted the harshness of secession for
the British and acted as another powerful Indian precedent for aspiring independent states.
Sovereign India made herself the chief spokesmen of rising colonial nationalisms and of
criticising Apartheid in South Africa, although most Indians there, as descendents of
coolies, were of low caste status and might have suffered a different kind of
discriminations in the Indian Motherland from that under Apartheid.
The Rise of Nationalism through Decolonisation
Generally,
success in one country fired nationalism
in other colonies.
Decolonisation, thus, became a very complex process of interaction between nationalisms
of various colonies. In the wake of Indian independence, Ceylon and Burma became
independent. Indonesia succeeded in warding off a colonial re-conquest by Holland m
1949, because the USA intervened fearing, Indonesian nationalism, in frustration, might
turn to the Communist camp, thus drawing Decolonisation into the complex of the EastWest Conflict. Since Communists were, undoubtedly leading the independence movement
of Vietnam France was given a free hand to suppress the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh,
especially after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. But the military victory of the
Vietrninh at Dien Bienphu initiated the Algerian War of Independence, both in 1954. The
Algerian War, in its turn, hastened autonomy and sovereignty for most'of the remaining
French colonial empire, which the French Motherland in vain tried to remodel after the
example of the British Commonwealth. As a direct consequence of the Algerian War, the
French had to concede autonomy first to Morocco and Tunisia in 1955, then full-fledged
sovereignty in 1956, then also for French Black Africa in 1956/60, in order to forestal
similar wars of colonial liberation there. Yet another facette of combining anti-colonial
movements with the Cold War and ethnic issues can be seen in Malaya, where the British
succeeded in isolating the largely Chinese Communist rebels from the Malaysians and to
suppress them by rigorous counter-guerilla actions.
Even before India, key Arab countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Syria) and the
Philippines had gained their national independence right in the Wake of World War II.
Arab nationalism in the Middle East hit hardest against Jewish-Zionist Nationalism over
Palestine and the newly formed State of Isre!. The Middle East Conflict, basically a
'product of competing nationalisms claiming the same land and water, is a maze of
complications of its own, which cannot be outlined here, since too large a part of World
History would have to be mobilised to explain it rationally. Its repercussions-four
ArabIsrael Wars, so far, and the provocation of Muslim Fundamentalism, both Shi'ite and
Sunnite (Muslim Brothers), the Lebanese Civil War since 1975 and internal struggles
within the Arab camp between radicals and moderates-are
still with us and are a source
of until now unending conflicts, from the Gulf War to the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait.
Next to the primary role of India, an important distinction has to be made: Wherever
the colonial powers had established their rule in the most indirect and loosest way of
protectorates, like in Morocco and Tunisia, or where they had refrained from taking land
for white mass settlements, as in parts of Tropical Africa it became possible to achieve
national independence by political means, generally without violence, just by dismantling
the protectorate and fully installing native rulers again. In contrast, the greater vested
interests of the colonial power, usually (Vietnam excepted) symbolised by white mass
settlements (Algeria, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Angola, Mozambique), long-drawn
wars of national liberation became the rule.
The Cold War and Its End
Anti-colonial wars of ootionalliberation were further complicated by the additional
factor of the Cold War, first in Vietnam. Rivalry for power and ideology drew the

protagonists
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of the Cold War into conflicts about Decolonisation:

The USA and ,other

NATO at least indirectly supported the colonial power in question (France, Portugal),
usually by supplying weapons and giving financial assistance, whereas the Soviet Union
and her satellite countries, but also the People's Republic of China, supported the
national liberation mo-vements. Because they got arms and military training mostly from
Communist countries, new regimes, after their victory, increasingly opened themselves to
Socialist-Communist influences. For about one decade, Fidelist Cuba, trying to break her
isolation in Latin America, imposed by the USA acted as a powerful, though truculent
lieutenant of Soviet Communism in some African countries (Angola, Mozambique;
Ethiopia) by direct interv0ntions with military and civilian "volunteers". Both, the Soviet
and Cuban ascendancy over large parts in the Third World, are coming to an abrupt end
with the collapse of Communism in Central Eastern Europe and its collapse in the Soviet
Union itself.
The drawn of Communism was provoked by the armed resistance in Afghanistan
against the expansion of Communism in a country whose nationalism is a remarkable
mixture of religious fervour, clannish particularism and love for independence. Afghan
nationalism received an additional sharp edge by its extreme ambivalence: On the one
hand, it is particularly strong, since the traditional state of Afghanistan was one of the
latest in World History to be formed (in secession from Persia), only about 250 years
ago. On the other hand, Afghan nationalism is notoriously ridden with internal
factionism, which could be overcome only in reaction against outside invasion, British in
the last century, Soviet Russian during the last decade. It is another irony of History, that
the Communist technique of supplying weapons to guerrilla movements against capitalist
and imperialist powers has been ttimed in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, once it
had moved into Afghanistan to support an unpopular Communist government by outright
military suppression against nationalist guerrillas who received their weapons and
ammunitions from outside for different motives, the USA China and Iran.
Meanwhile, much of the Third World is exploding or rather imploding under the
pressure of growing ethnic sub-nationalisms, wherever ruling majorities are trying to
impose their cultural and political values on unwilling minorities in repressive
assimilation from above. Again, the European experience can help to understand what is
going on now in most of the Third World national states.
European Background
Since the reality and concept of the national state is Europan, it becomes unavoidable
to cast a few comparative glances at the European precedents. After all, each colonial
power was also a national state of its own and stamped its particular "national"
modification on the living realities of their particular colonies: Law and law courts,
schools, churches, public administration, military service, entertainment including
modem sports, and, above all language-they
all had their part in moulding the minds of
Asians and Africans under European colonialism. Hence all the well-known specific
differences between "anglophone" and "Francophone" new national states, to mention
only the most important colonial powers, whos~ language became a lingua franca in their
former colonies. Additional complications were created by a variety of considerable
overlapping between colonial powers in possession of a given territory. In fact, most of
them grew out of colonial administrative units within given borders that remained largely
unchanged.
There exist powerful historical precedents for that mechanism in Europe. Often
enough, former provinces of the Roman Empire had provided the formal frame-work for
some of the proto-nations of Western and Southern Europe. More clearly, the American
States usually took their moulds from former colonies or administrative units. Even in
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Latin America the largest units, the Vice-Kingdoms,
broke up in the process of
struggling for independence, along the boundaries of smaller administrative units, the
General-Capitanaites.
The reason is simple: Life in provinces or colonies had bred
regional interests and solidarities that spilled over into the struggle for independence and
after achieving independence. New traditions had grown within the boundaries of colonial
administrative units. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire gradually broke up along the lines
of its former provinces (pashaliks), both before and after World War I, giving birth to new
national states in Southeast Europe and the Middle Eas~. Some even go back to Roman
times, like Syria. The expansionism both of present Syria and Iraq are justified by the
propaganda of both regimes by pointing to historical precedents from the Ottoman
(Kuwait) and Roman Empires (Lebanon, Palestine/lsrael). Thus, no one should take
exception pointing out the colonial background of new national states in the Third World.
It is hard to imagine, how, given colonial rule, the development could have been different.
The Contentions Legacy of Colonial Boundaries and Empires
If boundaries had been changed by colonial powers themselves in the colonial past,
they could leave additional conflicts between post-colonial successorstates, as recently
between Libya and Chad. The Border War between India and China of 1962 escalated from
a dispute over the "correct" MacMahon-line, e.g. a frontier drawn by the British. Togoland
and the Cameroons had been first German colonies, but were partitioned between England
and France as League of Nations Mandates after World War I. Their present "national"
boundaries reflect the colonial partition of both countries. Different problems crop up
when a new post-colonial national state was welded together from colonies, ruled by
different European powers, as in the case of Somalia. The Somalis in the past never had
had a national state of their own. But after the Second World War, new Somalia was
pieced together by joining British Somalia with Italian Somalia, while leaving French
Somalia (Djibouti), the Somalis of the Northwestern Frontier in Kenya and of the Ogaden
in Ethiopia outside the new Somali national state. Powerful Somali- "irredenta" was the
logical result, exploding into the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-78.
Yet other inconsistencies could escalate into tensions and violent conflicts where
traditional empires claimed to have become the frame-work for modem national states,
such as Ethiopia or Iran, without granting their former subject peoples the status of
national minorities by full-fledged autonomy. Traditional empire'ideology, combined with
modem nationalism, inevitably bred tensions, once the ruling imperial nation tried to
impose their own values, culture, religion and language as the only valid way of life by
repressive assimilation. In still other cases, nationalism adopted a quasi-imperial stance
by trying to preserve imperial unity, achieved or restored by European colonial rule. India
is the most important example, with consequences right up to India's recent intervention
into the Sri Lanka Civil War.
'
Just like in Somalia, there had never existed traditional states within the present
"national" boundaries of the Philippines and Indonesia. Their present boundaries are the
result of Spanish and Dutch Imperialism. Indonesia even annexed Western New Guinea as
"Irian", only because it had been part of the Dutch colonial empire, although historically,
the Papuans or "Irian" have never belonged to the cultural sphere of Java or Sumatra, and
are structurally almost as alien to the civilised Indonesial).s as they had been to the
colonising Dutch. Egypt would have preferred to keep the Sudan under her rule after
Independence as well, but had to grant a plebiscite in 1955, which went in favour of
Sudan's precarious independence with her own sub-imperialism of the Muslim North v

the Animist/Christian South. In all such cases, the pathose of nationalism with its
democratic implications could imperceptibly drift into an imperial or even imperialist
stance of more traditional character: Rule of a majority by the force of superior military
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colonialism, would clash with the ideals of intrinsically democratic nationalism, also in
the Third W orId.
Pre-Colonial Continuities
The reasons for that remarkable phenomenon are emerging only after 45 years of
experience with post-colonial nationalisms and with broader perspectives of comparative
World History: Behind the facade of the European colonial state as the matrix of the new
post-colonial national states, are looming much more massive continuities of societies in
Asia and Africa. They had their own traditions and patterns from their pre-colonial past,
only submerged, not really destroyed by colonialism. However modified by the
anonymous forces of Industrial Revolution also invading Asia and Africa, they re-asserted
themselves more or less, sooner or later, again as usual in History. Just as presently with
the collapse of Communism pre-revolutionary traditions, wl)ich had been submerged by
the revolutionary flood for a while, are re-emerging, from Leipzig to Mongolia, thus,
after the end of Colonial rule pre-colonial continuities of older standing are re-appearing:
Egypt is harping on its pharaonic past. Other Arab nationalisms are going back to the
Muslim Empire of the Middle Ages: "Baath" (R=ebirth, Renaissance) in the official title
of rivalling Arab Socialists in Syria and Iraq, points to the Rebirth of the glorious ArabMuslim Empire of the Caliphate. Shaka, the historical ideal of the ANC in South Africa,
was the very effective, though shortlived builder of a Zulu Empire in the early 19th
century, through floods of African blood. Pre-colonial history, idealised and romanticised,
becomes the basis of contemporary Third World nationalism, ]ustas in the First World
and the ex-Second (=Communist World).
'
,
Compared with pre-colonial History, the colonial period was only a brief interlude,
lasting usually only a few decades, during which colonial rule was in undisputed power.
However modified by the European and colonial part of their heritage, that heritage
remained foreign, exotic for them. On the whole, traditional elements, largely submerged
by the foreign colonial rulers, re-bounced after independence with a vengeance, sooner or
later.
With pre-colonial traditions also pre-colonial tensions re-appeared, however modified
by colonial rule, as e.g. in Nigeria or Sri Lanka. Older patterns of hegemonial aspirations
are re-emerging and escalating to conflicts, internal and external ones. The Gulf War
between Arab countries and Iran, Vietnam's sub-regional imperialism in Indochina, are
only some more spectacular examples. More complicated is the three-cornered struggle for
Arab hegemony between Egypt, Syria and Iraq, complicated by the presence of modernised
and powerful Israel. These modem conflicts can aiso be explained by long-term patterns or
mechanisms of power politics since the Ancient Orient. And the modem State of Israel is
a modernised version of the Biblical Empire of the old Jews under their great Kings David
and Solomon in the relative power vacuum after the invasion of the "Sea Peoples" around
1200 B.C. Resurging continuities from the past can also lead into internal conflicts, as to
be explained later in some relative detail.
The Importance of National Boundaries
Two of the greatest problems that new states are facing are boundaries and internal
structure. Nations rarely live in neat complexes with clear-cut boundaries. Usually they
have a more or less solid core of compact or homogeneous population, whereas to their
peripheries there prevails a kind of interlocking between two or more national groups. A
state without national minorities is rather the exception than the rule. The larger a state,
the greater the probabilities of national minorities. Clear-cut borders' between national
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states, therefore, are hard to find. Somewhere the line had to be drawn, creating national
minorities usually on both sides. And those national minorities may, in their turn,
become national "irredenta" or even "fifth columns" for any state bent on expansion.
The problem of frontiers is further complicated by other considerations than the
national principle: "Natural frontiers", economic arguments of varying sorts, the
neverending search for strategic defence control of passes over high mountains, access to
the ~ etc. can combine strategic with economic motives and may be advanced to press
temtorial claims, not warranted by the national composition of a given area. And then
there is the historical argument: That or the other territory once had belonged to an
Empire considered to be the forerunner of a national state and therefore has also to belong
to the contemporary successor state. Or a certain region once had played a crucial role in
the national history of a people, e.g. as the cradle of a nation in the Middle Ages, or of its
modem literature. The land of the ancestors may have been lost in the course of time, but
could now be reclaimed, even if one's own nationality there has become only a minority,
like Eritrea for Ethiopia or the Kosovo for Serbia.
For all possibilities mentioned above in an abstract outline, there can be found
pr~edents in the history of European nationalism. They all breed conflicts, some of them
simmering or escalating to our very present. Romantic nationalism, linked to an idealised
past of a once powerful empire, will inevitably make for violent conflicts between the
nationality or nationalities, whose ancestors had once been subjugated by one's own
imperial forbears. If. they, in their turn, can find an Empire of their own that once had
conquered the same area, the conflict scenario is perfect. Southeast Europe even had in
store an example of a three-cornewd struggle between three modem national states for the
same territory-Makedonia,
once claimed by Greece, Serbia/Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The
result are several Balkan wars under varying names and the present partition of Makedonia
between all three states.
In Europe, the creation of new stateS had been settled by the recourse to violence,
either through wars of national liberation or unification (Italy, Germany) in the 19th
century, or profiting from major wars (poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Finland)
in the 20th century, after the First World War. The most recent ex-colonial national states
in the Third World emerged from the European Second World War, but now have to
transform colonial administrative units into national states within given borders. Mter
most of Africa had become independent, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in
1963 even wisely decreed not to change the regime of international borders. The reason is
clear and simple: Any major revision of frontiers, let alone by force, would unleash a
flood of revisionist claims, that would throw Africa into complete chaos of wars for
borders or "national" re-alignments.
The complications
of nations and nationalities in Eastern Europe are already
bewildering enough, in the Balkans are even more frightening, only to be 'bettered' by the
Caucasus, as Gorbachov is to learn to his dismay. Black Mrica is even more ethnically
heterogenous. "National" boundaries there are perhaps even more impossible to draw than
elsewhere: With a symbolic figure of 100,000 political entities that claimed sovereignty
for themselves, often enough also through "imperial" expansion over neighbouring
peoples, no modern state could be formed. As usual, an amalgamation of traditional
political and social units to form modem structures could only come from outsiders who
would try to impose their own patterns and would transform traditional societies in the
process. This is what Imperialism and Colonialism did, the historical effect of which can
only be compared with the conquests of the Roman Empire in barbarian Europe outside
Italy and Greece.
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has to do with the same kind of

heterogenity, only now turne1inside a new national state. The plurality of the ethnical,

linguistic, religious and cultural composition of new national states in the Third World
also breeds economic and social divergences, ranging from "wild" tribes in inac;cessible
hills, swamps or forests to intensive farming and highly urbanised populations. The vast
differences in socio-economic development only add to the other differences. They make
for tension that can explode into violence in times of crisis. In the worsening ecological
situation elementary and traditional bones of contention, such as water and soil, come
again to the foreground for armed conflicts.
Imperial Pan-Nationalisms

and Ethnic Sub-Nationalism

As a kind of modem super-nationalism we can understand pan-movements that
transcend the boundaries of normal national states. Again, Europe provides the relevant
historical precedents-Pan-Germanism
and Pan-Slavism. Both were intimately linking
national to Great Power imperial dimensions, German and Russian respectively. The two
greatest parallel pan-movements in the Third World today are Pan- Turanism and PanArabism or Pan-Islamism. Both are reactions against political fragmentation under foreign
rule, against the traditional Tsarist Russian Empire and modem Imperialism. Both are
conjuring the mystique of past empires, embellished and romanticised over the centuries.
Both want to sweep aside boundaries, once imposed by former imperial or imperialist
masters, thus threatening existing national states. The consequences are in all cases
explosive, potentially or actually.
Pan- Turanism appeals to the unity of Turkish-speaking people living outside the
modem Turkish Republic. After World War I, Pan-Turanism had first swept the south of
the Russian Tsarist Empire with the downfall of both the Tsarist and the Ottoman
Empire, but was suppressed by Soviet power. Now, in a comparable situation during the
collapse of Communism and with the Soviet Union in apparent dissolution, PanTuranism is again appealing to Turkish-speaking peoples, frustrated and disorientated by
70 years of Communist rule. This time, Pan-Turanism is even more powerful than in
1920, since Great Russian Soviet Communism has, notwithstanding the harshness of
Soviet rule, meanwhile introduced its Turkish-speaking
peoples into the world of,
modemisation and industrialisation. Again ideological cues are taken from a past idealised:
From Aserbaidshan to Mongolia, Dshingh~skhan is riding high again. The effects on
several existing states are potentially shattering-the
Soviet Union, Iran; even China,
because Sinjiang is Chinese East Turkestan, and Inner Mongolia is becoming equally
unrestive.
Pan-Arabism, in constant tension to rivalling Pan-Islamism, is the ideology of Arab
national socialists, from Nasser to Saddam Hussein. Their dream of the one Arab nation
is the product of romantic idealisation of the past and sheer power politics to whip up the
Arab masses against both Western "Imperialists" and super-rich Arab oil kings and
princes. The blend of nationalism, pan-national empire building and national socialism,
coupled with extreme militarism and the open disdain of international law , is making the
present Gulf Crisis so explosive. The bid for "Arab unity" alone, over the heads of
existing national states could set the whole world ablaze.
The sanction by religion through a fundamentalist interpretation of any of the great
world religions gives to that kind of imperial pan-nationalism an added force: The Arab
Empire of the Muslim Caliphate had, after all, also its religious aspect, making it a kind
of theocracy. Any appeal to another "Holy War" by an Arab national socialist, such as
Saddam Hussein, mixing social grievances with national or pan-national aspirations ("one
Arab nation"), is courting desaster, either self-destruction or destruction of the present
political world order. Such a shattering event, so far, never happened without bloodshed
and violence.
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In contrast to macro-regional pan-nationalisms, a new useful category is that of subnationalism, usually defined by ethnic and/or religious identities within national states.
They can become activated into a process of self-destroying escalation by assimilationist
repression from above which provokes secession into national independence. The question
of language, usually is one of the bones of contention. The imposition of Urdu in EastPakistan led to the explosion of East-Bengal nationalism and the independence of
Bangladesh in 1971. Most national states of the Third World presently are plagued by
similar conflicts.
A World History Perspective
Taking the longest historical view possible, one fundamental difference between
European and Third World nationalism emerges from a comparative look: There are three
great stages of socio-economic formation in Mankind (1) hunters and gatherers without
social structures beyond the horde and economic activities in the strictest sense; (2)
extensive agrarian production on a subsistence level, with clans, tribes and tribal
chiefdoms or kingdoms as the highest levels of social and political organisation; (3)
intensive agriculture and cities with sophisticated economic activities, politically
organised into city-states and great empires, in modern times on the basis of
industrialisation with modern states, most of them are or claim to be national states.
From this emerges the following structural difference between Europe and the Third
World: Since the Middle Ages, the spread of the "process of civilisation" (Norbert Elias)
has practically stamped out the two older forms of socio-economic development in
Europe. Despite the collapse of the West Roman Empire under the onslaught of the
"invasion of the barbarians", the Roman-Latin version of the Mediterranean civilisation of
the Ancient Orient survived in the Church, Orthodox and Catholic, which the expansion
of her mission to large parts of Europe beyond the frontiers of the former Roman Empire
included into European civilisation. However low the level of Civilisation may have been
in the Latin West between 500 and 1000, compared roughly with Ancient Greece and
Rome, the principle of civili~ation as such was saved and recovered in the course of time,
thanks also to imports of know-how and technologies from the two other great centres of
civilisation, India and China. And on that basis, with Industrial Revolution, Europe
entered the stage of industrial civilisation, of course to varying degrees in various parts of
the Continent as a whole. National differences and conflicts within Europe can partly be
explained by the different share in ~e process of civilisation.
Africa and Asia, in contrast were, until recently, more influenced by traditional stages
of social and economic developments, Africa more, Asia less. Even the two great centres
of civilisation in Asia, for all their huge dimensions, included within their pale large
pockets of populations living on the level of gatherers and hunters and subsistence
agriculture, India possibly more than China. The difference of cultural level between
hunters and civilisation even in Africa and Asia was and is immense, and it alone
accounts for a great deal of present difficulties, Third World Nations are encountering in
their serious business of "nation-building". They have to homogenise groups spanning
thousands of years of development within a few decades. And the great civilisations of
Asia, on their part, were even relegated by Imperialism into colonial or quasi-colonial
dependencies of Europe, India more so than China. The distance between the "West" and
the two great traditional civilisations increased even more by the industrialisation of
Europe plus North America. The long-stagnant civilisations of Asia, relegated to
"underdeveloped" or "developing" countries are now eagerly absorbing Industrialism on
their part, while they are desperately trying to level the great differences of development
within their own national boundaries.
These remarks are advanced here only with great hesitations, indeed, because they
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might be easily misconstrued as an example of Western civilisation arrogance. Yet they
are meant in an effort to appreciate the enormous difficulties, modern national states in
the Third World are facing. Also, as a Westerer, I am fully aware of the cruel fact that
Western modern industrial civilisation is leading Mankind as a whole into a terrible
impasse of possible ecological catastrophe. After all, there is one superb irony in the
present situation: Structural homogenisation of post-colonial Third World national states
could well lead into elimination of the last surviving hunters and gatherers under the
pressure on land by agriculture or industry. After all, they represent only a tiny fraction of
world population and need a "wasteful" lot of land for eking out their marginal existence.
But their land, usually forests, are becoming central for the elementary preservation of
environment and climate, for the very survival of Mankind. Cutting down the last of the
primevial forests to make room for peasants, agrarian industry is inviting the collapse of
world climate on the globe as a whole.

Post-Colonial

Conflicts

in the Third

World

The triumph of anti-colonial national self-determination through Decolonisation in
the wake of the Second World War has also unleashed the more destructive forces of
nationalism in the Third World. Since then, the mystique of "nation-building" has turned
sour under the stresses of many conflicts, that have cropped up, sooner as in the Indian
sub-continent
in 1947, or later. Nation-building
implies filling the ex-colonial
administrative units, that have become new nations by sheer necessity, with modern
political contents. The new nations have been thrown together in their present boundaries.
They have to live together or must die together. The national state, has taken its form,
inevitably, from the former colonial powers, while the substance came from withinpeople, cultural values and traditions. Once the colonial Empires had dissolved under the
hot "wind of change", social and political conflicts, that had been frozen and put in coldstorage by the "Pax Colonialica", ~ecame active again. Instability is the logical
consequence of those changes. The many coup d'etats, civil wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions, (undeclared) international wars amongst post-colonial successor states to the
European colonial empires demand a minimum of historical categories common to all of
them. Otherwise the bewildering crowd of "bad" news from the Third World becomes
unmanageable and the chance for a rational analysis to find rational political solutions
will be missed.
Empires, Imperial or Colonial
Even a rapid comparative and necessarily "superficial" glance at the history of
national successor states both in Europe after World War I and in the Third World after
World War II suggests that there are comparable mechanisms at work: Many new national
states in Africa and Asia have been thrown into violent conflicts, of which the long-term
causes often are going back to pre-colonial history. The immediate bones of contention
may be social, economic and political factors of our time, but the actual confrontations
between conflicting sides often are prefigured by pre-colonial history, however modified
by colonial rule. And, the historical precedents are coming from Europe.
The decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire and of Austria-Hungary before and after
the First World War can be seen as structural analogies for better understanding what is
presently happening in large parts of the Third World since Decolonisation. The Ottoman
and Habsburg Empires on the one hand, the European colonial empires on the other,
point to an even more universal set of political structures-Empires,
great and small. The
largest of the European colonial empires, the British Empire, included, as its hard core,
with British India the mystique and continuity of oTieof the great traditional empires, that
of the Moghul Empire. The "Imperium Sovieticum" even had telescoped into one the
traditions and ideologies of three great Empires-Byzantium,
the Mongol Empire and
NlSJ-3
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Tsarist Russia. On the other hand, Europeans arrived at the scene of Africa and Asia
usually at a time of internal conflicts or even chaos. China was the great exception in the
16th century, but followed suit by her final crisis since the 19th century. Wherever
traditional empires had fallen under the direct or indirect influence of European colonial
powers, the nationalism of their leading nation took an imparial stance-restoration of the
grandeur of past empire became part and parcel of modem nationalism in China, India,
Persia.
Structurally, colonial Empires had the same function as dynastic Empires, both in
their ascendancy and their decline or everi demise: They had conquered other political or
even imperial structures that were paralysed by internal conflicts, or they had subdued
fragmented "barbarian" or semi-barbarian societies and often imposed on them, for the
first time, social and political structures that were "modern" by the definition of their
time. After inevitable destructions during or immediately after conquest, empires enforced
their new order of peace-"Pax
Romana" and "Pax Britannica" as the classical Models in
ancient and modern times. By the same token, we could also speak of "Pax Sinica", "Pax
Mongolica", "Pax Ottomanica", or, for that matter, of "Pax Colonialica".
Correspondingly,
modern European colonial empires had their share 111 the
ambivalent legacy of all great empires. They destroyed or suppressed older liberties and
societies, imposed their imperial rule and peace on the one hand, linked conquered peoples
to the centres of "modern" technically and materially "superior" civilisations on the other.
For British India Marx has described in remarkable articles, even before the Great Indian
Mutiny of 1857, the modernising impact of British colonial rule for India and welcomed
it. Imperial peace, however, was only relative: Wars at or beyond the imperial frontiers
were just as chronic as uprisings of the conquered against the conqueror. Imperial
"pacification" only violently suppressed conflicts amongst or with conquered peoples. The
two World Wars amounted to a kind of internal civil war between rivalling European
imperialist nations that loosened and then ended collective colonial rule of European
imperialist powers.
With their decline and dissolution, imperial and colonial empires released or
reactivated conflict potential, old and new-from post-imperial successor states after the
disintegration of the Hittite Empire, the downfall of the West Roman Empire to the end
of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires after World War I. In the wake of Decolonisation
as "dissolution of colonial empires" (Franz Ansprenger), we now have post-colonial
successor states wiLh the claim or the burden to become modem national states. Sooner or
later, often older historical structures reasserted themselves, modified by factors of the
vanished (dynastic or colonial) Empire and/or by new migrations or conquests from
outside, as in the cases of the breakdown of the Roman Empire in the West 476 and of
the Chinese Empire in the North 220/317. New "nations" could arise, such as on the soil
of the Roman Empire as the basis for new proto-national states in medieval Europe.
Modem colonial analogies are to be found in North and Latin America, since World War
II also in Asia and Africa, where the process of "nation-building" has become one of the
urgent, but also conflict-producting concerns of contemporary politics.
The term "successor state" was first used, apart from the "diadoch empires" to the
Alexandrian Empire, for the new or enlarged states of SouLheast and East-Central Europe,
that had arisen after World War I with the collapse of Lhree dynastic Empires-Tsarist
Russia, Austria-Hungary and Imperial Germany. But in a more general sense, the term
could become useful also for earlier "successor states" to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th
century (Greece, Serbia, Rumania) and 20th century (Bulgaria, Albania; the Arab staLes,
Palestine/lsrael). Today, also ex-colonial states in the Third World can be seen as postcolonial "successor states" to former colonial empires.
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The breakthrough of the principle of national self-determination in the fall-down of
dynastic Empires in 1918 advanced to the inspiring model for the anti-colonialist and antiimperialist national movements in colonial countries ever since. In particular, after World
War II, Pan-Africanism, trying to overarch particular nationalisms in Africa, felt inspired
by the victory of national movements in Southeast Europe after World Wat 1. The logical
consequence of national self-determination, however, is, the notorious "balkanisation of
Africa". It was taken as an inevitable secondary risk, and was hoped to be overcome by
appealing to a wider principle, that would be bridging "national" differences by PanAfricanism, understood as continental or "racial" unity amongst the new African national
states.IO

Post-colonial successor states, after World War II, may hence be usefully compared
with post-imperial successor states after World War 1. The mechanisms of producing
conflict by transforming regional (Tribal) or religious loyalties into politically defined
"national" loyalties within the new "national" state, are basically the same. Only the
actors of the drama, their costumes and language, are changing from place to place.
The Eastern Question: A Historical Precedent
The concept of post-colonial "successor states", therefore, points to the multinational, dynastic Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires as precedents for better
understanding the conflict-producing
mechanisms during the decline and after the
dissolution of colonial empires, if only because their history is more (Austria-Hungary)
or less (Ottoman Empire) satisfactorily researched. The knowledge of the complicated
Eastern Question with its many ramifications, the rise of new national movements and
national states, the complicated relations between successor states since their victories, in
particular after World War I, thus becomes a key for better understanding comparable
events in Asia and Africa since World War II.
Internal peace, imposed by Imperial Power, had forced rivalling ethnic or religious
groups into peaceful co-existence. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, its system of the
millet-structure had given a remarkable variation of autonomy to peoples defined as
religious communities-besides
Islam the Orthodox Greek, the Armenians and the Jews.
In the agony of the Ottoman Empire, the millet-system broke down under the onslaught
of defeat against Russia and Western ideas. Traditional loyalties, defined in religious
terms, now transformed themselves into political loyalties, defined along national lines.
This extreme politicization disrupted the Ottoman Empire: After the secession of the
Serbs since the Uprising of 1804 and of the Greek since the Greek War of Inqependence
1821-29, the Armenians, hitherto "the most loyal millet", demanded territorial autonomy.
During the .8th Russo-Turkish War of 1877/78 hatred and resentment exploded into an
orgy of mutual massacres, of which the Christian West only perceived the Bulgarian
Massacres by the "unspeakable Turk" (Gladstone), while ignoring worse Christian
atrocities against Muslims and Turks,u
The Turks drew lessons from their traumatic experience: They adopted nationalism
for themselves and combining it with their position as the ruling nation of the Ottoman
Empire. The mixture of Imperial Nationalism proved explosive in a manner different from
the German version of the same combination of both principles. Executing one central
demand of integral nationalism, the Jacobin slogan "la nation une et indivisible", the

~

10
11

"

1. Geiss: The Pan-Mrican Movement, London, Boston 1974.
Kemal H. Karpat: The Social and Political Foundation of Nationalism in South East Europe After
1878: A Reinterpretation, in: Kalph MelvillelHans-lurgen Schroder, ed·s.: Der Berliner KongreB von
1878. Die Politik der Grobmachte und die Probleme der Modemisierung in Sudostcuropa in der zweiten
Halfte de 19. lahrhunderts. Wiesbaden 1982, S. 385-410.

National Law School Journal .

26

Young Turks considered all the subjects of their Empire as the constituents of their own
version of nationalismP All had to conform to the Turkish model-language,
religion
and culture. Integral Turkish national assimilation, imposed from above after the French
model, was the kiss of death for the Ottoman Empire. It drove the Armenians into open
rebellion and initiated the cycle of assimilation by force, counter violence and more
repressions, escalating into the notorious Armenian Massacres.
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the east while generosity of the millet
structure finally turned into one of the most rabid national chauvinisms that persists to
the present. Still today, Turkish nationalism pretends that there are no national or
religious minorities in modern Turkey. All have to conform to the Turkish nation in any
case. On the other hand, the Turks claim all former conquests of the Ottoman Empire as
rightfully belonging to their Turkish national heritage, which had been illegitimately
alienated from them by wicked foreigners. Thus, the deadly mixture of integral Turkish
repressive assimilationist
nationalism and Ottoman Empire ideology is inevitably
provoking more conflicts-with
Armenians and Kurds, whose national identities remain
ignored, denied and suppressed. The effect of suppression is known from Historyresistance, thus, further conflicts and violence.
In a milder key, the Hungarians after the Compromise of 1867 displayed the Magyar
version of the same mechanism-Greater
Hungarian Empire-building
and Magyar
assimilationist nationalism against all minorities-above
all Croates, Serbs, Rumanians,
Germans, Slovaks, Jews. Thus, the Compromise of 1867 also opened Antisemitism in
Hungary.B To be sure, the level of violence in Hungary was much lower than in the
Ottoman Empire, but its most extreme manifestation, the outrage of Sarajevo, as an
outcrop of the Eastern Question sufficed for sparking off World War I in July/August
1914.14

The Ottoman Empire, therefore, provides an important geographical and structural
link between Europe and the Third World after Decolonisation. Some of the conflicts in
the Third World go back to conflicts emanating from the Eastern Question and the decline
of the Ottoman Empire before World War I-the Middle East Conflict between Israel and
the Arabs; the conflict between Armenians and Turks, now spilling over into the south of
the Soviet Union; the conflict between Kurds and Turks or Arabs, of Arabs and Turks in
the former sandjak Alexandrette; of Arabs and Persians in Iran itself, but also, of course,
between Iraq and Iran. The recent conflicts of the Turks with both the Bulgarians and the
Greeks, which in the case of Bulgaria was restirred by a post-Stalinist regime in a
desperate attempt to divert attention from internal problems, has its origins also in the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Also the structural conflict between Serbia and
Albanians of Kossovo, which could disrupt all Yugoslavia, is a direct, if involved
consequence both of the rise of the Ottoman Empire and its decline.
The present disintegration of the Soviet Union is also unleashing a whole chain of
Turkish nationalisms in the whole of the southern Soviet Union. It is even spreading to
Chinese East TUrkestan (Sinjiang) and could well land the People's Republic of China
into her Vietnam or Afghanistan War on her own national soil with all the well-known
after-effects of such wars on the super-powers, the US~ and the Soviet Union.
Imperialist "Pax Colonialica": The Price of Indirect Rule
Applied to the post-colonial
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especially in Africa, the following picture, in the barest outlines, emerges with the help

of the historical categories derived from the foregoing analysis-rise

and fall of a "Pax

Imperialica" and its consequences on '~uccessQr states": As during historical conquests in
other periods, the Europeans as-outsiders were often drawn into existing power vacua.
They intervened into internal disputes as aIlies of one or the other party in civil wars,
even as "li6erators" or "protectors" for suppressed peoples, or simply as mediators to
establish peace, which turned out to be a forerunner of the "Pax Colonialica". In Africa,
the abolition of the Slave Trade and the suppression of Slavery, linked to the spread of
Christian Missions and the first beginnings of industriaHsation, had a prominent part.
Here, the protection of one of the chief victims of the Slave Trade, the Ibo in the East of
the South of modem Nigeria, or even of African middlemen (Fanti/Ga at the Gold Coast,
modern Ghana) against slave rading African states were of particular importance.
The "Pax Colonialica", unable to solve constructively the many autochthonous precolonial conflicts, suppressed them rather and put them on ice. Speaking now of Africa
only, the colonial powers had been largely ignorant about the historical background to the
regions, into which they moved. Moreover, the comparatively short span of unchallenged
colonial rule in the interior of Africa-strictly
speaking hardly more than one generation,
from 1884185,(taking the Berlin Africa Conference as a more symbolic date) to 1914--did
not leave them sufficient time tb acquire the necessary detailed knowledge. They proved
unable to develop practical criteria for sdlving constructively the host of older regional
and local conflicts, for any solution would have involved taking sides for one or the other
conflicting party, and compromises would have satisfied none in the long run.
The colonial powers, therefore, saw themselves, by and large, confined on leaning on
those native factors that promised to preserve the new colonial peace and order at a
minimum of cost to the imperial "Mother Country": Imperialism on the cheap was the
prevailing method, wherever possibl~hus,
the colonial powers usually backed the
traditional power elites on the spot. Shorn of some aspects of their power basis (slave
raiding, slave trading, domestic slavery), the position of the old elites was henceforth
safeguarded by the colonial power, while the traditional powers submitted to the
Europeans as a kind of colonial6uzerain. In some parts of West Africa traditional rulers
under colonialism even gained more power over their subjects, e.g. territorially, such as
the Sultanate of Sokoto over large parts of the Middle Belt that had never been actually
conquered by the Fulani cavalry in the pre-colonial Jihad until 1840. At the Gold Coast,
tradi~onal rulers became more autocratic than they had ever been under a more powersharing (unwritten)
constitution
or customary government
before the formal
establishment of colonial rule. In effect, many traditional rulers enjoyed under colonial
rule a more or less large and more or less well-defined degree of autonomy, in what was
only vaguely systematised in parts of British-Africa as "Indirect Rule", along the lines of
British India. But, owing to the force of circumstances, a kind of undeclared indirect rule
was practised in most other colonial empires, at least on the village level, where direct
colonial presence and penetration was rare and the least effective. Exceptions to any kind
of "Indirect Rule" are to be found wherever colonial powers tried consciously to destroy
native power structures in order to make room for white settlers by annexation and
confiscation of African land, above all in Southern Africa, (including Germans in SouthWest Africa/Namibia)
and Algeria, on a lesser scale also in German East-Africa
(Tanganyika), Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia, Zimbabwe), Angola and
Mozambique. Such attempts, however, provoked sooner or later armed resistance. Once it
had started after World War II, it quickly was supplied with modem forms of organisation
and weapons, coming from outside under the conditions of the Cold War. Those struggles
escalated into regular wars of national liberation, where the colonial claim of transforming
African territories into "White Man's Country" was defended with the power of the
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Western Mother Country. Thus, "Direct Rule" and the alienation of African land lay at
the bottom of most anti-colonial wars of liberation and of the yet unresolved conflict in
and about South Africa, until recently also in Namibia.
"La mission civilisatrice" of Colonialism: lndustrialisation

and Nationalism

Great imperial powers usually were also centres of civilisation, expanding the
frontiers of civilisation by their conquests of less developed countries and peoples-from
the conquest of Nubia by pharaonic Egypt to the continental expansion of Tsaris~ Russia
in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East. Most great traditional empires had their
"mission civilisatrice" vis-a-vis the "savage" or "barbarian" peripheries or lesser
"civilised", as a reality or as an ideology.
The civilisation represented and expanded by European "Pax Colonialica" was the
modern Western way of life, based on technology and industrialisation. Its spread to
Africa and Asia in the wake of colonial rule initiated complex economic, social and
political developments, behind their backs. The expansionist dynamics of Imperialism and
its various "missions civi/isatrices", thus, threw Colonialism into a dilemma, from
which it could never extricate itself: on the one hand, its political rule relied on a kind of
social status quo, wherever Colonialism tried to rule indirectly, using traditional elites.
On the other hand, European technology and social values introduced elements of rapid
social change, by the very presence of Europeans.
Contrary to the intentions of the colonial powers, they transcended the narrow
confines of "Indirect Rule" and its original aim of Conserving the new status quomodified traditional power under the suzerain power of colonial rule. In particular, the
suppression of domestic slavery and its preconditions (slave raids and slave trade),
followed up by Christianity and the penetration of industrialism, subtly, but radically
changed African societies fundamentally and partly destroyed traditional structures, just as
industrialism and the modern state had destroyed most aspects of traditional agrarian
society back in Europe.
This "modernisation" by industrialisation, however slow and indirect it may have
filtered from the Coast to the Interior, did revolutionise colonial societies. Social change,
initiated by the colonial powers, quickly went beyond Christian missions and their
schools or the various agencies of colonial government: Expanding infrastructures, both
traditional and modern, served expanding domestic markets and provided links to
expanding world-markets, first for agrarian goods, later also for raw-materials from Africa.
Consumer goods from industrialised countries entered Africa in increasing volume, as
uscal, with ambivalent economic consequences: On the one hand, traditional crafts went
down, on the other hand, modem local industries were springing up, especially during
both World Wars when the import of consumer goods from Europe was drastically
reduced.
qne of the complications of the situation is that all those developments took place
within the frame-work of colonial administration units that foreshadowed (as in the case
of Latin America) the frontiers of the coming "national states". Here is a difference to the
case of India that otherwise offers instructive parallels: By 1856, with the completion of
the conquest of the Punjab, and just one year before the Great Mutiny of 1857, the British
Raj had achieved for India the "national" unity of the subcontinent, which even had the
historical precedents of the Ashoka and Moghul Empires. The colonial powers, however,
carved up Africa into about 50 colonial units. In all fairness, it ought to be added that the
four dozens of colonial administrative units and now national states were by far fewer than
the literally innumerable political units within pre-colonial Africa, which claimed
sovereignty. 100,000 is only a symbolic figure, but may be close to historical reality.
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Thus, colonial rule usually joined together heterogenous ethnical groups, peoples or parts
of peoples, that mostly differed greatly in language, culture, religion, social and political
structures. The new colonial administrative units within their largely arbitrary frontiers,
established the formal frame-work of the future national states. Development towards
independence had to take place within the new colonial, later "national" frontiers. On the
other hand, some new colonial units comprised territories that had not belonged to them
in pre-colonial days, such as Kashmir and Assam in India, West Irian in Indonesia. Only
because the imperialist power had once conquered them, the new nationalist states laid
claim to them as well: Secessionist movements were inevitable, once such foreign
territories did not receive a sufficient measure of autonomy. The colonial state usually
was a strange mix between intended over-centralisation and autonomy of some kind
through the unavoidable practice of autonomy.
Conflicts-

Old and New

The heterogenous set-up of ex-colonial "national" states made clashes inevitable in
the process of "nation-building" after independence, if only because it had to be decided
who would become the leading element, whose historical tradition and set of cultural
values would become predominant, how the national income would be allocated. Even the
problem, whether to keep the language of the former colonial power as the "national"
official language and as the lingua franca amongst members of the new national state,
acquired practical dimensions: The language of the colonial overlord is neutral coming
from an outsider and represents a kind of compromise between rivalling native language
groups. It also helps to prevent most African and Asian countries from relapsing into
cultural and intellectual isolation and to avoid the explosive issue to decide, which of the
competing African or Asian languages in a given "national" state could or should become
a truly national language. India in Asia, Belgium, in Europe, each in their particular way,
have shown, how the problem of languages can tear apart societies and states.
Historically, older tensions and conflict potentials from the pre-colonial era, thus,
were only conserved, even if sometimes considerably modified by the comparatively brief
colonial rule over Africa. The anti-colonial pathos of Asian and African nationalism
against the common enemy had only covered up for a while internal differences. But,
again as usual in history, internal conflicts exploded, sooner or later, once victory had
been achieved and the former external enemy had gone.
As in the Ottoman Empire in its agony before 1914, traditional religious or regional
differences became politicised in a complex process of economic, social and intellectual
change under the general impact of Industrial Revolution, beginning with the later periods
of colonial rule. That change released destructive energies that made for new conflicts
along older lines. Also India in her tragic hour of national independence-triumph
of
nationalism and an outburst of communal mutual massacres between Muslims and
Hindus-can
help to explain, at least abstractly, what happened (and is still happening) in
Africa in a more muffled way, only highlighted by violent explosions.
In South-East Europe conflicts had first been ignited about Church and schools, both
in competing drives for national self-assertion or even "national" regionalisms, well
before World War I. In Black Africa, where I know developments better than in other
Third World regions, social conflicts crystallised in particular around housing and jobs in
the quickly expanding cities, because here members of many peoples or "tribes" met and
had to co-exist. The case of Nigeria is particularly instructive: Under the conditions of
rapid industrialisation,
elementary searc't for work and housing in the centres of
industrialisation, the cities, converted social issues into explosive political ones. The
principle of loyalty and mutual self-help for members of the extended family and of
"tribal" units in traditional agrarian society made almost automatically for "tribalism" in

30

National Law School Journal

the new circumstances of industrialisation. Where jobs and housing were short, collective
help for their own "kith-and-kin", automatically coincided with other "tribal H loyalties.
The transformation of "tribal unions" in cities, particularly in Lagos, into regionally
based political parties with the claim of a national following, first took place in Nigeria
between 1944 and 1951, at first in the South, then also in the North. Again, the Ibo took
a leading part, by founding the NCNC in 1944 in Lagos. At the same time first
communal clashes occurred in Nigerian cities, first Yoruba against Ibo in Lagos
(originally Yoruba land) in the late 1940s, then also IbolYoruba against Muslim
Haussa/Fulani in the North. What may then have looked as regrettable birth pangs of new
nations in statu nascendi, with historical hindsight, appears as first symptoms of future
violent conflicts, of the Nigerian Civil War of 1966-71.
In the final phase of Decolonisation, even more so since national independence,
traditional ethnic ("tribal") solidarities often strengthened by religious bounds, were
politicised under the dynamics of the new economic and social change. In times of severe
economic stress, wholesale actions on a "national" level could result such as the mutual
expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana and Ghanaians from Nigeria in the early 80's.
Conflicts could erupt between national minorities of different states, as recently between
the citizens of Mali and Mauretania. Similarly, wherever there were active economic
minorities-Lebanese
in West Africa, Indians in Eastern Africa-they
were threatened
with expulsion or actually expelled, as the Indians from Uganda in 1972, the early years
of Idi Amin, all in the name of Africanisation, i.e. social nationalism in a very narrow
sense. In Asia such economic minorities were usually Chinese. They were expelled or
were fleeing sooner or later from countries having achieved independence-Indonesia,
Vietnam, Cambodia, the Communist countries of South East Asia thus demonstrated a
new variance of national socialism in one country-national
Communism, Chinese,
Indians or Lebanese played the role of Jews in coutries without Hebrews, scapegoats or .
lightening rods for diverting internal tensions on minarities treated as foreign and
"parasitic" elements. Internal tensions were turned outside by producing traditional
refugees on land or "boat people" over sea.
Post-Colonial

Conflictsand

Pre-Colonial History

With the coming of national independence through Decolonisation, pre-colonial
History is coming back, everywhere. The longer the period of post-colonial independence
is becoming, the more the colonial period takes the character of an interlude, howeveJ
formative for the present. Traditional factors of longer standing are reasserting themselves
again however modified by the colonial past. Hence, the knowledge of pre-colonia:
history of Third World Countries becomes the more imperative to understand recent
present and future developments.
In particular, conquests somewhere in the pre-colonial past now acquire an urgency oj
their own. Usually, they had established structures of political rule and subordination thai
have been carried on through the colonial period, under some form of "indir«Ct rule" 01
another. For Africa, slave raiding and slave holding, e.g. by the Berber and Tuareg tribe~
in the Sahara against the black peasant tribes of the Savanna, are but another variety oj
such historical conquest. With the coming 'of national independence after World War II
communal or regional resentments could escalate to political tensions and could gain
"national' dimensions, once they were linked to the issue of political leadership in the
coming national states. Traditional claims for leadership or hegemony from pre-colonial
history were and still are bouncing back with a vengeance on post-colonial national
states. The conflicts, they were and are producing, could be internal and external or
international, often complicated or exploited by rivalling World Powers during the Cold
War.
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In internal conflicts, regions or whole peoples could press for leadership in the new
national states on the grounds that they had always been dominant, before the coming of
the Europeans. Or traditional ruling oligarchies, such as the Omani Arabs in Zanzibar and
Pemba or the Tussi in Ruanda and Burundi, would try to hold on to power, as long as
they could. But colonialism had also left behind as its ambivalent heritage, the novel
principle of democracy and majority rule, which dominated or even exploited majorities
would clam our for, sooner or later. The egalitarian principle would clash with wellstructured traditional societies, having more or less well-defined social and political
hierarchies. Such a clash was bound to produce conflicts, again sooner or later. Whenever,
on top of such conditions, centralising assimilations nationalism tried to take over, the
scenario for conflict was perfect: Repressive assimilation from above always provokes
resistance from below. It is an additional tragedy of its own that elections, conceived as an
instrument for settling differences politically, i.e. peacefully, under such conditions often
have quite a contrary effect: By focusing conflict material they too often act as cataclysms
for political explosions instead of helping to defuse tensions peacefully.
For external conflicts we have comparable patterns: The mystique derived from
former imperial conquest in the pre-colonial past made for pressing territorial claims in
the post-colonial present. Thus, Morocco refused to recognise Mauretania in 1960 for
some years, claiming the new national state and parts of Mali, after the final dis,>olution
of the Spanish colonial empire in Africa, also the Western Sahara and even waged a war
for pressing its territorial claims. The reasons given were above all historical. All those
territories had been temporarily Moroccan for some time after the conquest of the Sanghai
Empire by Morocco in 1591. Imperial claims usually die hard.
By the same token, the Middle \East Conflict can be seen as the clash between
rivalling nationalisms not only to the same land, but also to re-build their particular brand
of former Empire, which, of course, had been based on conquest-the
Jews with modern
Israel the Empire of David and Solomon 3,000 years ago, the Arabs their Caliphate,
which had lost Arab control more than thousand years ago. Thus, the haunting memories
of pre-colonial conquests and empires can breed post-irr.perial conflicts in the present,
even if the historical Empires in question may have been dead for millennia or centuries.
Fundamentalist revival movements, such as with ultra-Orthodox Jews and with militant
Muslims (above Shi'ites and extreme sects) only exacerbate conflicts. They are already
explosive and complicated enough over more mundane matters, such as land, water under
the additional and increasing pressure of population explosion.
Post-colonial

Conflicts in Africa

These more general remarks can be easily specified by going into some more detail,
which, of course, must be dealt with in a summary way, after all. It seems expedient, here
to concentrate on the one continent I know best, Africa, and on the continent I happen to
speak presently, Asia. In some African countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, hints of
future conflicts can be discovered even in the transitional period between the end of World
War II and the coming of actual independence.
In the struggle for political domination over future Nigeria, the Muslim North based
on the strength of the Sultanate of Sokoto, threatened with secession, if the more
advanced and more christianised South would take the lead or even impose a solution of
centralised government. One of the chief spokesmen of the North, the first Federal Prime
Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in 1947 obliquely hinted at history with
the vailed threat that in "the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to
the sea."15 Ever since, the South feared the continuation of the FulanilHaussa Jihad,
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"interrupted" by the intervention of British missionaries on behalf of the Yoruba of Ibadan
in 1840, and many Southerners interpreted political domination of the North over the
Federation since 1959 as the peaceful execution of that indirect threat of 1947. This was
the historical background to the Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War of 1967-70.16
Similarly, parliamentary representatives of Ashanti demanded for themselves the
political leadership in future Ghana because of the greater economic power of Ashanti
(gold, cocoa). Admittedly provoked in a heated parliamentary debate, quickly getting out
of hand, one Ashanti spokesman even added his own version of the Haussa/Fulani
argument of "interrupted conquest to the sea": Unless the British colonialists had stopped
us, the Ashanti would have conquered the coastal peoples. I? In both cases, only the
military intervention of European colonialism had interrupted a process of internal
conquest, which was deemed natural by the descendants of those warlike peoples.
The protracted civil war in the Sudan has a similar historical pattern underlymg in
whole conflict. Here, native imperialism of Turco-Egyptian provenance, had succeeded in
conquering both, the Arabised North and the animist Negro South in 1821 and 1875
respectively. Anglo-Egyptian reconquest 1898 and Condominium 1899 had led to the
South being protected from Islamisation, but opened to Christian missions. After
independence in 1956, the Muslim Northerners wanted to undo the work of colonialism
and subject the South to an integral Islam, making the Sharia the law of the land.
There are other confrontations-Christian/"animist"
South against the Muslim
nomads of the Sahara in the vast Savannah-Sahel-Sahara belt reaching from S~egal to
Sudan; "Creoles" and "America-Liberians" against the 'hinterland" of Sierra Leone and
Liberia; Matabele against Mashona in Zambia; Hutu against Tussi in Rwanda and
Burundi; Buganda against the Nilotic peoples of Uganda as at least part of the background
to coups, civil wars and massacres in Uganda; the (meanwhile historical) antagonism of
the (mostly black) descendants of ex-slaves against the Omani Arab aristocracy in
Zanzibar, that led to the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964.
In four African states studied by Albert Wirz in depth (Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Zaire),
the general policy and behaviour of then new ruling elites only exacerbated an already
potentially explosive situation-they
quickly became self-enriching, carrupt oligarchies,
who took the place of the former colonial oligarchy. IS Everywhere, they indulge in
'ostentatious consumption in cities with increasing social polarisation and are continuing
the colonial policy of concentrating investments on the urban and industrial'centres. They
live at the expense of the agrarian "bush", which is further burdened with the increased
pressure of taxation on an already poor and further impoverishing agrarian population. In
territories outside the "ethnic" ("tribal") base of the ruling oligarchies, the representatives
of the new state often act with a quaskolonialist
arrogance, treating the "periphery" or
"bush" provinces of "minorities" almost like occupied enemy countries-Southerners
in
the North of Chad, Northerners in the South of Sudan. In Nigeria the overbearing of the
three major peoples in the three regions (Yoruba in the West; Ibo in the East;
Haussa/Fulani in the North) drove the many "minorities" into opposition, and their
revolts (e.g. the Tivs in the Middle Belt) escalated the conflicts amongst the three greater
peoples to the brink of civil war.
In the Sahara/Sahel zone, from the Atlantic to the present state of Sudan, we have a
different kind of historical backlash: Here the clash between Nomad slave drivers in the
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desert (Berber, Tuareg, Arabs) and black peasants to the South were the dominant
contradiction of long standing. As in the case of Nigeria and the Sudan, colonial rule and
its suppression of internal African slavery19 had had a dramatic effect, because it turned the
tables between former slave masters and enslaved peasants: The proud "sons of the deser:t"
lost their traditional social basis of holding slaves in the new national states. In those
states, which are straddling both the Sahara and the Sahel Savannah zone (Mali, Niger,
Chad, Central African Republic), the largely animist black peasants were quicker to take
to modernisation
through Christian missions and their mission schools, while the
Muslim desert tribes remained in proud, but stagnant isolation. The black peasants, partly
Christianised and more modernised, took over the lead in the new national states and
reduced their former slave drivers and slave masters to marginal minorities. A more
subtle, but terrible revenge [or millennia of humilation through slaveraiding and slavery
wars wrought upon the by now distressed desert nomads during the two great droughts in
the 70ies and 80ies, when relief supplies from the outside world were largely withheld
from those needing them most, Tuarges and Berbers in the Sahara. Presently, the Tuarges
of Mali are in open revolt against continuing discrimination and suppression, bordering to
a modem revival of traditionaJ warfare between the desert nomad tribes and the black
peasants, but now with the advantage plainly on the side of the Blacks, who are
controlling the resources and weapons of the modem national state: Another genocide is
in the offing.
Complicated chapters of their own are the conflicts within and around Ethiopia:
Imperial Ethiopia, a conquering dynastic power structure, has many parallels with the
Ottoman Empire or Russia, which continue also after the revolutionary coup of 1974.
The perennial conflicts with Eritrea and the conflict with Somalia over Ogaden
demonstrate, how in the Horn of Africa internal and external conflicts can become also
indistinguishable.
The conflicts around Apartheid in South Africa, so far, have been more of internal
character, but have been spilling over for some time into neighbouring territories and
states, from Namibia to Angola and Mozambique. Here, we have an example of early
white quasi-colonial conquest, a comparatively big minority subjugating a huge and
growing majority that is becoming irresistible, once it is drawn into the maelstroem of
modernisation and industrialisation. The present civil war in Liberia is another example of
the blending modem with traditional factors. The ruling oligarchy of the almost white
Americo-Liberians,
liberated slaves from the South of the USA and settled by white
Americans around Monrovia since 1821, had set themselves up as an inefficient, almost
parasitic minority over African tribes. In 19HOit had been overthrown by a military coup'
d'etat, basically by members of the oppressed tribes. Their leader became a petty
bloodthirsty military dictator who was overthrown in a long-drawn civil war by members
of tribes who had been suppressed by President Doe. Tribalism, long decried by wellmeaning Western sociologists and historians as a mere phantom, is a reality, -leading to
bloody night-mares.
Apart from internal conflicts, Africa is rent by international conflicts which could
escalate to undeclared wars. They are usually spa:-ked off by the clash of territorial claims,
sometimes based on the right of historical conquest. Disputed frontiers, drawn or modified
by colonial powers, are other sources of tensions, such as between Algeria and Morocco,
Libya and the Chad. The claim of "Greater Somalia" on the Northwest of Kenya and on
the Ogaden, conquered by Ethiopia in its last phase of imperial expansion after 1855,
19
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however, is based on the modern principle of national self-determination, although a
Somalian national state, comprising all or most Somalis, had never exist~d. A similar
problem is posed by the Ewe, divided between Togo and Ghana.
In its founding document, the OAU had underwritten the principle of preserving all
existing frontiers in Africa, because a substantial revision of frontiers somewhere would
provoke a host of claims for changing frontiers. Africa may be "mal partie" by
colonialism, but the present status quo is apparently preferred to changes with unknown
consequences: It is impossible for Africa to go back to pre-colonial frontiers, because then
its "balkanisation"
and fragmentation
would become even greater. Meanwhile,
considerable movements of population, in particular to the Coast and to urban and
industrial cities, have thrown old "tribal" patterns at least there into such hopeless
confusion that they demand supra-"tribal" categories for avoiding or solving social
tensions. Any claim for "reuniting" ethnic groups divided by colonial, now national
frontiers, would raise the problem where to reunite them-in which of the new states, or
in a new "national" state of their own? Clashing claims on raw-materials for modern
industries (phosphat, mangan, oil, uran) more often than not have become the true hard
core of at least some international conflicts. Arguments drawn from history are hardly
more than mere ideology for justifying territorial claims.
Ex-colonial "national states" in Africa, however "artificial", fragile and precarious in
their threatened existence they may appear now, have become, in spite of all
shortcomings,
the most pragmatic frame-work for Africa's political and social
developmer.t. The general problems emanating from universal mechanisms, outlined
above, are complicated and serious enough. General demographic growth, the World
Economic Crisis since 1973, and the effects of two disastrous droughts within the last 15
years on large parts of Africa have aggravated economic and social hardships. "National"
frontiers, inherited from colonial rule, have since Decolonisation become much more
fQrmalised and impenetrable than they ever had been under colonialism. Large-scale
migrations covering wide distances-traditional
transhumance of stock-raising no mads in
the Savannah-Sahel-Sahara
zone and migrant workers-are
being obstructed. Above
the traditional "tribal" loyalty a new "national" loyalty is emerging, without practical
solidarity for the "foreign" African. "Foreign" minorities are often treated as enemies, by
directing internal social and political tensions on them, as demonstrated by the massexpulsion of Indians from Uganda, of Nigerians from Ghana, of Ghanaians from Nigeria.
Under the growing pressure of hunger and poverty the negative consequences of the new
"national" frontiers are likely to be felt even more sharply, breeding more conflicts in
African "successor" states.
Post-colonial

Conflicts in Asia

Comparable conflicts are raging in Asia. IIi Burma, national socialism and militarism
has turned the country in self-imposed isolation from one of the richest countries into one
of the poorest in Asia. Also here the conflict between the central government and national
minorities (Karens) is one of the indigenous sources for impoverishment and further
repression. The repressive regime of national military socialism seems presently to be
breaking up in conflicts comparable to those in former or still Communist countries of
Southeast Europe (Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania), but also offers parallels with present
China since the massacre on Tienamen Square.
In Sri Lanka the conflict between Tamils and Singhalese was additionally
complicated by internal tensions within Singhalese and Tamils plus the djalectical
relationship of majority and minority. The Singhalese, as the Greeks on Cypein, are the
majority on their island state, but they are a minority in the wider region including
Southern India or Tamil Nadu alone. Thus, the Tamil minority, once partly favoured by
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the British, as the Singhalese claim, are now threatened by a Singhalese national revival
that harps on the time-honoured theme of noble descent from the Aryans. Sri Lanka,
therefore, demonstrates indirectly the racial and social tensions underlying the caste
system, which is presently breaking down in India, the very cradle of that caste system.
India, in her turn, has her own measure of conflicts, internal and external ones. The
caste system, originally the oldest instance of applies apartheid: A conquering elite of
"white" stock subjugating peoples of "darker" and "inferior" stock. The system of
institutionalised discrimination, between various castes, or better "jatis", and all castes
against the casteless, the pariahs and sanctified by religion is presently disintegrating
under the stresses of industrialisation and modernisation, especially in urban conditions.
Tensions between language groups that tend to acquire "national" dimensions in a
subcontinent that is, in reality, beyond the limits of a normal European national state,
such as England, France or Germany. In addition, religious conflicts are being rekindled
by an extreme Hindu fundamentalism that is consciously exploiting religion as a political
weapon.
Furthermore, India has acquired an imperial stance of her own, that had only been
overlaid by the British Raj as Emperor of India. The largest colony with the earliest and
largest national movement in the world re-asserted her imperial stance after acceding to
independence. Also in India nationalism had become married to the dreams of Empire: The
British Colonial Empire would have been continued as an Indian Empire, albeit under the
banner of an Indian Republic. Then Indian nationalism sought consolation, gradually
imposing her "Pax Indica" on outlying states in the Himalaya with varying degress of
influence for a Republican Suzerain in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, which was even
absorbed into India in 1974. The three post-colonial wars with Pakistan were also postimperial wars over strategic places such as Kashmir. India succeeded in weakening
rivalling Pakistan by skilfully exploiting divergences between West and East Pakistan
Punjabi imperial postures vis-a-vas the Bengalis of East Pakistan provoked tensions,
resulting from the contempt of warlike West Pakistanis for their more pliant Bengal
Muslim brethren in East Pakistan. The secession of BangIa Desh in 1971 was the wellknown result-again
a new national state born through war. Indian quasi-imperial
posture, however, is hitting against internal and external obstacles, as usual. Indian
military intervention into the civil war of Sri Lanka was a failure and solved nothing. At
the same time, India is locked in bloody struggles to prevent the secession of Kashmir
and Assam. Both territories do not belong to the cultural region of India proper, but had
been incorporated into present India by conquests of the British Raj for strategical
considerations-Kashmir
in defence of the Northwestern Frontier against Russian pressure
through Central Asia and Afghanistan, Assam on the way to the conquest of Burma. Now
Kashmir and Assam have become festering sores of India, joining other trouble spotsthe Punjab in conflict with the Sikhs; the breakdown of the caste system, which sets free
more of self-destructive energies; the resurgence of the Hindu-Mulsim struggle, rekindled
by a massive Hindu fundamentalism and chauvinism.
Afghanistan, the chronic Middle East Conflict, the persecution of Kurds in Turky and
Iraq, the Gulf War and the Kuwait invasion by Iraq-all
offer examples for those
conflicts. China is threatened from within by revolts of various national minorities
Uigurs in Sinjiang (East Turkestan), Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, which coupled
with economic failure under the exorable pressure of further rapidly growing population,
might lead to explosions in Han-Chaina proper, comparable with those in Eastern
Europe, only much more violently so. Pakistan is suffering from violent tensions
between some of her component parts, in particular more traditionally minded Sindis in
Sind and Punjab Nuslim refugees since 1947, who arrived more urbanised and
spohisticated, converging unto the larger cities, especially Karachi and Hyderabad, where
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they are locked in a muffled civil gang warfare.
The Modernisation-Fundamentalism Dilemma
From these and many other post-colonial conflicts emerges a grim dilemma: All
those conflicts are as many aspects of the great world crisis, produced by the clash
between traditional and modernising factors in our world. The approximate balance
between the three great World Civilizations had been destroyed, irrevocably, so far, by the
"Rise of the West" (William H. Mc Neill). Yet the underlying principles of Eastern
Civilizations, India and China, persist in governing their particular ways of life of the
two greatest nations in the World, despite all the technical gadgets of our modem
Industrial Revolution, which are affecting their daily life everywhere, more or less.
Practical solutions for their problems, mounting under the pressure of modernisation and
self-destructive growth of population probably have a chance of success only, if they
remain broadly within the frame-work of traditional values. But they can be executed in
our modernising world only with modem, secular methods, which, more often than not,
are hurting traditional values.
The dilemma, just mentioned, then reads thus: On the one hand, traditional values,
usually expressed in religious terms, are threatened by Modernisms. The more
fundamental the general crisis or malaise as a result, the more radical will be the reaction
of Fundamentalism of all sorts, everywhere. Fundamentalism, by taking the holy words
of their respective religion literally in our Modem World, escalate tensions, normal in
such huge transformation as that of Industrial Revolution, into deadly conflict, again
everywhere.
A sober historical analysis of post-colonial conflicts might help to induce to greater
tolerance by dissolving superiority and inferiority complexes. We might find room to turn
our attention to more urgent tasks that really matter, trying to curb industrialisation, a
product of the West since European Expansion Overseas from becoming self-destructive
for all Civilization and even Mankind in gener~l.
Perhaps nothing more than last-minute chance in desperation is the attempt to apply
the common sense of federalism to the heterogeneous national states of the post-colonial
Third World, but also to Eastern and Southeastern Europe: The more heterogeneous a
society, the more a maximum of autonomy on as many levels as possible might help to
defuse tense situations, because any attempt at enforced homogenisation will inevitably
provoke violent from those resisting assimilation by repression from above. Federalism
could decentralise power and institutionalise the respect for minorities.
A new concept of federalism might also allow a constructive regrouping of postcolonial successor states: India is, really, not a a modem national state on a part with
England or France, but a..whole sub-continent of her own, to be compared with Europe,
which is just now coalescing into a federation of sovereign national states. India,
conceived as a comparable sub-continental federation, could allow her present (and future)
states, with only a restricted measure of autonomy in a largely centralist Indian Union, to
develop into veritable national states, with arrangements
for strong provincial
autonomies, all held together by an Indian Confederation. India then might feel strong and
self-confident enough to shed those exposed parts that are not culturally and religiously
Indian (Kashmir, Assam), allowing them to join adjacent new federations. By the same
token, other federations could be formed that would have to take the place of imperial pannational
movements,
such as Pan-Arabism,
Pan- Turanism
or Pan-Hinduism.
Neighbouring federations could even co-operate fruitfully with each other, instead of

indulging in deadly confrontation and rivalry. But time is pressing, because there are
deadly time-bombs ticking away almost everywhere.

